Assortment and Price Optimization
Under the Two-Stage Luce model

Alvaro Flores∗ Gerardo Berbeglia† Pascal Van Hentenryck‡

Monday 22nd April, 2019

Abstract

This paper studies assortment and pricing optimization problems under the Two-Stage Luce model (2SLM), a discrete choice model introduced by Echenique and Saito (2018) that generalizes the multinomial logit model (MNL). The model employs an utility function as in the the MNL, and a dominance relation between products. When consumers are offered an assortment $S$, they first discard all dominated products in $S$ and then select one of the remaining products using the standard MNL. This model may violate the regularity condition, which states that the probability of choosing a product cannot increase if the offer set is enlarged. Therefore, the 2SLM falls outside the large family of discrete choice models based on random utility which contains almost all choice models studied in revenue management. We prove that the assortment problem under the 2SLM is polynomial-time solvable. Moreover, we show that the capacitated assortment optimization problem is NP-hard and but it admits polynomial-time algorithms for the relevant special cases where (1) the dominance relation is attractiveness-correlated and (2) its transitive reduction is a forest. The proofs exploit a strong connection between assortments under the 2SLM and independent sets in comparability graphs. Finally, we study the associated joint pricing and assortment problem under this model. First, we show that well known optimal pricing policy for the MNL can be arbitrarily bad. Our main result in this section is the development of an efficient algorithm for this pricing problem. The resulting optimal pricing strategy is simple to describe: it assigns the same price for all products, except for the one with the highest attractiveness and as well as for the one with the lowest attractiveness.

1 Introduction

Revenue Management (RM) is the managerial practice of modifying the availability and the prices of products in order to maximise revenue or profit. The origin of this discipline dates back to the 1970’s, following the deregulation of the US airline market. A large volume of research has been devoted to this area over the last 45 years, with successful results in many industries ranging...
from airlines, hospitality, retailing, and others (McGill and van Ryzin, 1999; Kök, Fisher, and Vaidyanathan, 2005; Vulcano, van Ryzin, and Chaar, 2010).

Two main problems lay in the core of RM theory and practice: the optimal assortment problem, and the pricing problem. The optimal assortment problem consists of selecting a subset of products to offer customers in order to maximize revenue. Consider, for example, a retailer with limited space allocated to mobile phones. If the store has more than 500 mobile phones that can be acquired through its distributors (in various combinations of brands and sizes) and the mobile phone aisle has capacity to fit 50 phones on the shelves, the store manager has to decide which subset of products to offer given the product costs and the customer preferences.

In order to solve the assortment problem we need a model to predict how customers select products when they are presented with a set of alternatives. Most models of discrete choice theory postulate that consumers assign an utility to each alternative and given an offer set, they would choose the alternative with maximum utility. Different assumptions on the distribution of the utilities lead to different discrete choice models: Celebrated examples include the multinomial logit (MNL) (Luce, 1959), the mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) (Daly and Zachary, 1978), and the nested multinomial logit (NMNL) (Williams, 1977).

The multinomial logit model (MNL), also known as the Luce model, is widely used in discrete choice theory. Since the model was introduced by Luce (1959), it was applied to a wide variety of demand estimation problems arising in transportation (McFadden, 1978; Catalano, Lo Casto, and Migliore, 2008), marketing (Guadagni and Little, 1983; Gensch, 1985; Rusmevichientong, Shen, and Shmoys, 2010), and revenue management (Talluri and Van Ryzin, 2004; Rusmevichientong, Shen, and Shmoys, 2010). One of the reasons for its success stems from its small number of parameters (one for each product): This allows for simple estimation procedures that generally avoids over fitting problems even when there is limited historical data (McFadden, 1974). However, one of the flaws of the MNL is the property known as the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), which states that the ratio between the probabilities of choosing elements \(x\) and \(y\) is constant regardless of the offered subset. This property does not hold when products cannibalize each other or are perfect substitutes (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985; Debreu, 1960; Anderson, Depalma, and Thisse, 1992).

Several extensions to the MNL model have been introduced to overcome the IIA property and some of its other weaknesses; They include the nested multinomial logit and the latent class MNL model. These models however do not handle zero-probability choices well. Consider two products \(a\) and \(b\). The MNL model states that the probability of selecting \(a\) over \(b\) depends on the relative attractiveness of \(a\) compared to the attractiveness of \(b\). Consider the case in which \(b\) is never selected when \(a\) is offered. Under the MNL model, this means that \(b\) must have zero attractiveness. But this would prevent \(b\) from being selected even when \(a\) is not offered in an assortment.

On the other hand, the pricing problem amounts to determine the prices that a company should offer, in order to best meet its objectives (profit maximization, revenue maximization, market share maximization, etc.), while taking into consideration how customers will respond to different prices...
and the interaction between price and the intrinsic features that each product possess.

This paper considers both problems mentioned before, for the case when customers follow the Two-Stage Luce model (2SLM). The 2SLM was recently introduced by Echenique and Saito (2018) and unlike the MNL, it allows for violations to the IIA property and regularity (Berbeglia and Joret, 2017). The Two-Stage Luce model generalizes the MNL by incorporating a dominance (antisymmetric and transitive) relation among the alternatives. Under such relationship, the presence of an alternative \( x \) may prevent another alternative \( y \) from being chosen despite the fact that both are present in the offered assortment. In this case, alternative \( x \) is said to dominate alternative \( y \). However, when \( x \) is not present, \( y \) might be chosen with positive probability if it is not dominated by any other product \( z \).

An important application of the 2SLM can be found in assortment problems where there exists a direct way to compare the products over a set of features. For illustration, consider a telecommunication company offering phone plans to consumers. A plan is characterized by a set of features such as price per month, free minutes in peak hours, free minutes in weekends, free data, price for additional data, and price per minute to foreign countries. Given two plans \( x \) and \( y \), we say that plan \( x \) dominates plan \( y \), if the price per month of \( x \) is less than that of \( y \), and \( x \) is at least as good as \( y \) in every single feature. In the past, the company offered consumers a certain set of plans \( S_t \) each month \( t \) such that no plan in \( S_t \) is dominated by another plan (in \( S_t \)). The offered plans however were different each month. Using historical data and assuming that consumers preferences can be approximated using a multinomial logit, it is possible to perform a robust estimation procedure to obtain the parameters of such MNL model. Once the parameters are obtained, the assortment problem consists in finding the best assortment of phone plans \( S^* \) to maximize the expected revenue. A natural constraint in this problem consisting in enforcing that every phone plan offered in \( S^* \) cannot be dominated by any other. Section 4 shows that the problem discussed here can be modelled using the 2SLM and thus solving this problem is reduced to solving an assortment problem under the 2SLM.

2 Contributions

The first key contribution is to show that the assortment problem can be solved in polynomial time under the 2SLM. The proof is built upon two unrelated results in optimization: the polynomial-time solvability of the maximum-independent set in a comparability graph (Möhring, 1985) and a seminal result by Megiddo (1979) that provides an algorithm to solve a class of combinatorial optimization problems with rational objective functions in polynomial time. This is particularly appealing since the 2SLM is one of the very few choice models that goes beyond the random utility model and it allows violations the property known as regularity: the probability of choosing an alternative cannot increase if the offer set is enlarged. Since many decades ago, there are well-documented lab experiments where the regularity property is violated (Huber, Payne, and Puto, 1982; Tversky and Simonson, 1993; Herne, 1997).
The second key contribution is to show that the capacitated assortment problem under the 2SLM is NP-hard, which contrasts with results on the MNL. We then propose polynomial algorithms for two interesting subcases of the capacitated assortment problem: (1) When the dominance relation is attractiveness-correlated and (2) when the transitive reduction of the dominance relation can be represented as a forest. The proofs use a strong connection between assortments under the 2SLM and independent sets.

The third and final contribution, is an in-depth study of the pricing problem under the 2SLM. We first note that changes in prices should be reflected in the dominance relation if the differences between the resulting attractiveness are large enough. This is formalized by solving the Joint Assortment and Pricing problem under the Threshold Luce model, where one product dominates another if the ratio between their attractiveness is bigger than a fixed threshold. Under this setting, we show that this problem can be solved in polynomial time. The proof relies on the following interesting facts: (1) An intrinsic utility ordered assortment is optimal; (2) the optimal prices can be obtained in polynomial time; and (3) it assigns the same price for all products, except for two of them, the highest and lowest attractiveness ones. Many of these results are extended to the following cases (1) capacity constrained problems, where the number of products that can be offered is restricted and (2) position bias, where products are assigned to positions, altering their perceived attractiveness.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3 presents a review of the literature concerning assortment optimization and pricing under variations of the Multinomial Logit. Section 4 formalizes the 2SLM and some of its properties. Section 5 proves that assortment optimization under the 2SLM is polynomial-time solvable. Section 6 presents the results on the capacitated version, particularly the NP-hardness of the capacitated version of the problem, but also provide polynomial time solutions for two special cases. Section 7 presents the results for pricing optimization under the Threshold Luce model. Section 8 concludes the paper and provides future research directions. All proofs missing from the main text, are provided in Appendix A.

3 Literature Review

Since the assortment problem and the joint assortment and pricing problem are a very active research topic, we focus on recent results closely related with this paper and in particular, results over the multinomial logit model (MNL) (Luce, 1959; McFadden, 1978) and its variants.

Despite the IIA property, the MNL is widely used. Indeed, for many applications, the mean utility of a product can be modeled as a linear combination of its features. If the features capture the mean utility associated with each product, then the error between the utilities and their means may be considered as independent noise and the MNL emerges as a natural candidate for modeling customer choice. In addition, the MNL parameters can be estimated from customer choice data, even with limited data (Ford, 1957; Negahban, Oh, and Shah, 2012), because the associated estimation problem has a concave log likelihood function (McFadden, 1974) and it is possible to measure
how good the fitted MNL approximates the data (Hausman and McFadden, 1984). Moreover, it is possible to improve model estimation when the IIA property is likely to be satisfied (Train, 2003).

One of the first positive results on the assortment problem under the multinomial logit model was obtained by Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004), where the authors showed that the optimal assortment can be found by greedily by adding products to the offered assortment in the order of decreasing revenues, thus evaluating at most a linear number of subsets. Rusmevichientong, Shen, and Shmoys (2010) studied the assortment problem under the MNL but with a capacity constraint limiting the products that can be offered. Under these conditions, the optimal solution is not necessarily a revenue-ordered assortment but it can still be found in polynomial time.

Gallego, Ratliff, and Shebalov (2011) proposed a more general attraction model where the probabilities of choosing a product depend on all the products (not only the offered subset as in the MNL). This involves a shadow attraction value associated with each product that influence the choice probabilities when the product is not offered. Davis, Gallego, and Topaloglu (2013) showed that a slight transformation of the MNL model allows for the solving of the assortment problem when the choice probabilities follow this more sophisticated attraction model. This continues to hold when assortments must satisfy a set of totally unimodular constraints.

The Mixed Multinomial Logit (Daly and Zachary, 1978) is an extension of the MNL model, where different sets of customers follow different MNL models. Under this setting, the problem becomes NP-hard (Bront, Méndez-Díaz, and Vulcano, 2009) and it remains NP-hard even for two customer types (Rusmevichientong et al., 2014). A branch-and-cut algorithm was proposed by Méndez-Díaz et al. (2014). Feldman and Topaloglu (2015) proposed methods to obtain good upper bounds on the optimal revenue. Rusmevichientong and Topaloglu (2012) considered a model where customers follow a MNL model and the parameters belong to a compact uncertainty set. The firm wants to hedge against the worst-case scenario and the problem amounts to finding an optimal assortment under this uncertainty conditions. Surprisingly, when there is no capacity constraint, the revenue-ordered strategy is optimal in this setting. Jagabathula (2014) proposed a local-search heuristic for the assortment problem under an arbitrary discrete choice model. Davis, Gallego, and Topaloglu (2013) and Abeliuk et al. (2016) proposed polynomial time algorithms to solve the assortment problem under the MNL model with capacity constraint and position bias, where position bias means that customer choices are affected by the positioning of the products in the assortment. Recently, Jagabathula and Vulcano (2015) proposed a partial-order model to estimate individual preferences, where preference over products are modeled using forests. They cluster the customers in classes, each class being represented with a forest. When facing an assortment $S$, customers select, following an MNL model, products that are roots of the forest projected on $S$. This approach outperformed state-of-the-art methods when measuring the accuracy of individual predictions.

Attention has also been devoted to discrete choice models to represent customer choices in more realistic ways, including models that violate the IIA property (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). This property does not always hold in practice (Rieskamp, Busemeyer, and Mellers, 2006), includ-
ing when products cannibalize each other (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). Echenique, Saito, and Tserenjigmid (2018) identify these violations as perception priorities, and adjust probabilities to take their effects into account. Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer (2014) provide an axiomatic generalization of MNL model to address the case where the products share features. Fudenberg and Strzalecki (2015) propose an axiomatic generalization of a discounted logit model incorporating a parameter to model the influence of the assortment size.

Customers tend to use rules to simplify decisions, and before making a purchase decision, they often narrow down the set of alternatives to chose from, using different heuristics to make the decision process simpler. Several models of consider-then-choose models have been proposed in the literature, related with attention filters, search costs, feature filters, among others, another reasonable way to discard options, is when the difference between attractiveness is so evident, that the less attractive alternative, even when it is offered, is never picked (as in the Threshold Luce model, Echenique and Saito (2018)). Any of the heuristics mentioned before allows the consumer to restrict her attention to a smaller set usually referred in the literature as consideration set. This effect also provokes that offered product might result having zero-probability choices.

Several models have been proposed to address the issue of zero-probability choices. Masatlioglu, Nakajima, and Ozbay (2012) propose a theoretical foundation for maximizing a single preference under limited attention, i.e., when customers select among the alternatives that they pay attention to. Manzini and Mariotti (2014) incorporate the role of attention into stochastic choice, proposing a model in which customers consider each offered alternative with a probability and choose the alternative maximizing a preference relation within the considered alternatives. This was axiomatized and generalized in Brady and Rehbeck (2016), by introducing the concept of random conditional choice set rule, which captures correlations in the availability of alternatives. This concept also provided a natural way to model substitutability and complementarity.

Payne (1976) showed that a considerable portion of the subjects in his experimental setting use a decision process involving a consideration set. Numerous studies in marketing also validated a consider-then-choose decision process. In his seminal work Hauser (1978) observed that most of the heterogeneity in consumer choice can be explained by consideration sets. He shows that nearly 80% of the heterogeneity in choice is captured by a richer model based in the combination of consideration sets and logit-based rankings. The rationale behind this observation is that first stage filters eliminate a large fraction of alternatives, thus the resulting consideration sets are composed of a few products in most of the studied categories (Belonax Jr and Mittelstaedt, 1978; Hauser and Wernerfelt, 1990). Pras and Summers (1975) and Gilbride and Allenby (2004) empirically showed that consumers form their consideration sets by a conjunction of elimination rules. Furthermore, there are empirical results showing that a Two-Stage model including consideration sets better fits consumer search patterns than sequential models (De los Santos, Hortacsu, and Wildenbeest, 2012).

Form a customer standpoint, the use for consider-then-choose models alleviate the cognitive burden of deciding when facing too many alternatives Tversky (1972a,b); Tversky and Kahneman
When dealing with a decision under limited time and knowledge, customers often recur to screening heuristics as show in Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996). Psychologically speaking, customers as decision makers need to carefully balance search efforts and opportunity costs with potential gains, and consideration sets help to achieve that goal (Roberts and Lattin, 1991; Hauser and Wernerfelt, 1990; Payne, Bettman, and Luce, 1996). Recently Jagabathula and Rusmevichientong (2017) proposed a Two-Stage model where customers consider only the products are contained within certain range of their willingness to pay. Aouad, Farias, and Levi (2015) explored consider-then-choose models where each customer has a consideration set, and a ranking of the products within it. The customer then selects the higher ranked product offered. The authors studied the assortment problem under several consideration sets and ranking structure, and provide a dynamic programming approach capable of returning the optimal assortment in polynomial time for families of consideration set functions originated by screening rules Hauser, Ding, and Gaskin (2009). Dai et al. (2014) considered a revenue management model where an upcoming customer might discard one offered itinerary alternative due to individual restrictions, such as time of departure. Wang and Sahin (2018) studied a choice model that incorporates product search costs, so the set that a customer considers might differ from what is being offered.

Multi-product price optimisation under the MNL and the NL has been studied since the models were introduced in the literature. One of the first results on the structure of the problem is due to Hanson and Martin (1996), where they show that the profit function for a company selling substitutable products when customers follow the MNL model is not jointly concave in price. To overcome this issue, in Song and Xue (2007) and later in Dong, Kouvelis, and Tian (2009), the authors show that even when the profit function is not concave in prices, it is concave in the market share and there is a one-to-one correspondence between price and market share. Multiple studies shown that under the MNL where all products share the same price sensitivity parameter, the mark-up which is simply the difference between price and cost, remains constant for all products at optimality (Anderson, Depalma, and Thisse, 1992; Hopp and Xu, 2005; Gallego and Stefanescu, 2009; Besbes and Sauré, 2016). Furthermore, the profit function is also uni-modal on this constant quantity and it has a unique optimal solution, which can be determined by studying the first order conditions.

Li and Huh (2011) showed the same result for the NL model. Up to that point, all previous results assumed an identical price sensitivity parameter for all products. Under the MNL, there is empirical evidence that shows the importance of allowing different price sensitivity parameters for each product (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995; Erdem, Swait, and Louviere, 2002). There is is also evidence in Börsch-Supan (1990) that restricting the nest specific parameters to the unit interval results in rejection of the NL model when fitting the data, thus recommending to relax this assumption. The problem when relaxing this condition, is that the profit function is no longer concave on the market share, which complicates the optimization task. In Gallego and Wang (2014) the authors considered a NL model with differentiated price sensitivities, and found that the adjusted mark-up, defined as price minus cost minus the reciprocal of the price sensitivity is...
constant for all products within a nest at optimality. Furthermore, each nest also has an adjusted next-level markup which is also invariant across nests, which reduces the original problem to a one variable optimization problem. Additional theoretical development can be found in Rayfield, Rusmevichientong, and Topaloglu (2015); Kouvelis, Xiao, and Yang (2015) but there are restricted to the Two-Stage nested logit model. In Huh and Li (2015) some of the results were extended to a multi-stage nested logit model for specific settings, but also show that the equal mark-up property fails to hold in general for products that do not share the same immediate parent node in the nested choice structure, even when considering identical price sensitivity parameters. Li and Huh (2011) and Gallego and Wang (2014) extend to the multi-stage NL model and show that an optimal pricing solution can still be found by means of maximizing a scalar function.

There are some interesting results for other models that share similarities with the MNL, and therefore are closely related with the model that we are studying. In Wang and Sahin (2018), the authors incorporate search cost into consumer choice model. The results on this paper for the Joint Assortment and Pricing are similar to the ones that we study in Section 7, in that many structural results that holds at optimality for their model, are also satisfied in our studied case. They show that the quasi-same price policy (that charges the same price for all products but one, the least attractive one) was optimal for this model. Interestingly, the Joint Assortment and Pricing results under the Threshold Luce Model has a slightly different result: The optimal pricing is a fixed price for all products, except for the most attractive and least attractive ones. This led to a situation where there are many possible prices, not just two.

Recently Alptekinoğlu and Semple (2016) hast studied in depth a model which was originally due to Daganzo (1979) that assumes a negatively skewed distribution of consumer utilities. The resulting choice probabilities have an interesting consequence in the optimal pricing policy: They allow for variable mark-ups in optimal prices that increase with expected utilities.

The model considered in this paper is a variant of the MNL, proposed by Echenique and Saito (2018) and called the Two-Stage Luce model; It handles zero-probability choice by introducing the concept of dominance, meaning that if a product $x$ dominates a product $y$, then $y$ is never selected in presence of $y$. And therefore the consideration set is formed by considering only non-dominated products in the offered assortment, allowing flexibility on the consideration set formation due to the nature of the dominance relation. Once the consideration set is formed, the customer choose according to an MNL on the remaining alternatives. In the following section we describe this model in detail, and show some examples that highlight many practical applications for it.

### 4 The Two-Stage Luce model

The 2SLM (Echenique and Saito, 2018) overcomes a key limitation of the MNL: The fact that a product must have zero attractiveness if it has zero probability to be chosen in a particular assortment. This limitation means that the product cannot be chosen with positive probability in any other assortment. The 2SLM eliminates this pathological situation through the concept of
consideration function which, given a set of products \( S \), returns a subset of \( S \) where each product has a positive probability of being selected. Let \( X \) denotes the set of all products and let \( a(x) > 0 \) be the attractiveness of product \( x \in X \). For notational convenience, we use \( a_x \) to denote the attractiveness of product \( x \), i.e., \( a_x = a(x) \). We extend the attractiveness function to consider the outside option, with index 0 and \( a_0 = a(0) \geq 0 \), to model the fact that customers may not select any product. As a result, the attractiveness function has signature \( a : X \cup \{0\} \to \mathbb{R}^+ \). Given an assortment \( A \subseteq X \), a stochastic choice function \( \rho \) returns a probability distribution over \( A \), i.e., \( \rho(x,A) \) is the probability of picking \( x \) in the assortment \( A \). The 2SLM is a sub case of the general Luce model presented in Echenique and Saito (2018), and independently discovered in Ahumada and Ülkü (2018), which is defined below.

**Definition 1** (General Luce Function *, Echenique and Saito (2018)). A stochastic choice function \( \rho \) is called a general Luce function if there exists an attractiveness function \( a \cup \{0\} : X \to \mathbb{R}^+ \) and a function \( c : 2^X \setminus \emptyset \to 2^X \setminus \emptyset \) with \( c(A) \subseteq A \) for all \( A \subseteq X \) such that

\[
\rho(x, A) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{a_x}{\sum_{y \in c(A)} a_y + a_0} & \text{if } x \in c(A), \\
0 & \text{if } x \notin A.
\end{cases}
\]

for all \( A \subseteq X \). We call the pair \((a, c)\) a general Luce model.

The function \( c \) (which is arbitrary) provides a way to capture the support of the stochastic choice function \( \rho \). As observed in Echenique and Saito (2018), there are two interesting cases worthy of being mentioned:

1. If \( c(S) \) is a singleton for all \( S \subseteq X \), then \( \rho(x,S) \) is a deterministic choice.
2. If \( c(S) = S \) for all \( S \subseteq X \), then the 2SLM coincides with the MNL.

Two special cases of this model were provided in Echenique and Saito (2018). The first is the two-stage Luce model. This model restricts \( c \), such that the \( c(A) \) represents the set of all undominated alternatives in \( A \).

**Definition 2** (two-Stage Luce model (2SLM), Echenique and Saito (2018)). A general Luce model \((a, c)\) is called a 2SLM if there exists a strict partial order (i.e. transitive, antisymmetric and irreflexive binary relation) \( \succ \) such that:

\[
c(A) = \{ x \in A \mid \not\exists y \in A : y \succ x \}.
\]

We call \( \succ \) dominance relation.

As a result, any 2SLM can be described by an irreflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric relation \( \succ \) that fully captures the relation between products. The second model presented in Echenique and Saito (2018), which is a particular case of the 2SLM, is the Threshold Luce Model (TLM), where

---

*The definition is slightly different: It makes the outside option effect \( a_0 \) explicit in the denominator.
they explain dominance in terms of how big the attractiveness are when compared with each other, so $c$ is strongly tied to $a$. More specifically, for a given threshold $t > 0$, the consideration set $c(S)$ for a set $S \subseteq X$ is defined as:

$$c(S) = \{ y \in S \mid \nexists x \in S : a_x > (1+t)a_y \}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

In other words, $x \succ y$ if and only if $\frac{a_x}{a_y} > (1 + t)$. Intuitively, an attractiveness ratio of more than $(1 + t)$ means that the less-preferred alternative is dominated by the more-preferred alternative. Observe that the relation $\succ$ is clearly irreflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric.

The dominance relation $\succ$ can thus be represented as a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG), where nodes represent the products and there is a directed edge $(x, y)$ if and only if $x \succ y$. Sets satisfying $c(S) = S$ are anti-chains in the DAG, meaning that there are no arcs connecting them. For instance, consider the Threshold Luce model defined over $X = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$ with attractiveness values $a_1 = 12, a_2 = 8, a_3 = 6, a_4 = 3$ and $a_5 = 2$, and threshold $t = 0.4$. We have that $i \succ j$ iff $a_i > 1.4 a_j$.

The DAG representing this dominance relation is depicted in Figure 1.

In the following example, we show that the 2SLM admits regularity violations, meaning that it is possible that the probability of choosing a product can increase when we enlarge the offered set. Since regularity is satisfied by any choice model based on random utility (RUM), this shows that the 2SLM is not contained in the RUM class †.

**Example 1.** Consider the following instance of the Threshold Luce model (which is a special case of the 2SLM). Let $X = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ with attractiveness $a_1 = 5, a_2 = 4, a_3 = 3$ and $a_4 = 3$. Consider $t = 0.4$ and the attractiveness of the outside option $a_0 = 1$. For the offer set $\{2, 3, 4\}$, the probability of selecting product 2 is $4/11$ since no product dominates each other. However, if we add product 1 to the offer set, i.e. if we offer all four products, then the probability of selecting product 2 increases to $4/10$, because products 3 and 4 are now dominated by product 1.

The Two-Stage Luce Model allows to accommodate different decision heuristics and market scenarios by specifying the dominance relation responding to a specific set of rules. Two cases where this can be observed are provided below.

†Observe that this implies that the 2SLM is not contained by the Markov chain model proposed by (Blanchet, Gallego, and Goyal, 2016) since this last one belongs to the RUM class (Berbeglia, 2016).
Feature Difference Threshold: Assume that each product has a set of features $\mathcal{F} = \{1, \ldots, m\}$. A product $x$ can then be represented by a $m$-dimensional vector $x \in \mathbb{R}^m$. Assume that the perceived relevance of each feature $k$ is measured by a weight $\nu_k$, so that the utility perceived by the customers can be expressed as a weighted combination of their features $u(x) = \sum_{k=1}^{m} \nu_k \cdot x_k$. The dominance relation can be defined as $x \succ y \iff u(x) - u(y) = \sum_{k=1}^{m} \nu_k (x_k - y_k) \geq T$, where $T > 0$ is a tolerance parameter that represents how much difference a customer allows before considering that an alternative dominates another. The dominance relation is irreflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric and hence it can be used to define an instance of the 2SLM. One can easily show that this model is a special case of the TLM.

Price levels: Suppose we have $N$ products, each product $i$ has $k_i$ price levels. Let $x_{il}$ be product $i$ with price $p_{il}$ attached and it corresponding attractiveness $a_{il}$, we assume that for each product $i$ prices $p_{ik}$ satisfy $p_{i1} < p_{i2} < \ldots < p_{ik_i}$. Naturally, $x_{i1} \succ x_{i2} \succ \ldots \succ x_{ik_i}$, because for the same product the customer is going to select the one with the lowest price available. Each price level for each product can still dominate or be dominated by other products as well, as long as the dominance relation is irreflexive, transitive and antisymmetric. This setting can be modelled by the Two-Stage Luce model in a natural way.

5 Assortment Problems Under the Two-Stage Luce model

This section studies the assortment problem for the 2SLM using the definitions and notations presented earlier. Let $r : X \cup \{0\} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ be a revenue function associated with each product and satisfying $r(0) = 0$. The expected revenue of a set $S \subseteq X$ is given by

$$R(S) = \sum_{i \in c(S)} \rho(i, S)r(i). \quad (4)$$

The assortment problem amounts to finding a set

$$S^* \in \arg\max_{S \subseteq X} R(S)$$

yielding an optimal revenue of

$$R^* = \max_{S \subseteq X} R(S).$$

Observe that every subset $S \subseteq X$ can be uniquely represented by a binary vector $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ such that $i \in S$ if and only if $x_i = 1$. Using this bijection, the search space for $S^*$ can be restricted to

$$\mathcal{D} = \{x \in \{0, 1\}^n \mid \forall s \succ t : x_s + x_t \leq 1\}$$

where $\mathcal{D}$ represents all the subsets satisfying $S = c(S)$, which means that no product on $S$ dominates another product in $S$. There is always an optimal solution $S^*$ that belongs to $\mathcal{D}$ because $R(S) = R(c(S))$ and $c(S) \in \mathcal{D}$ for all sets $S$ in $X$. As a result, the Assortment Problem under the 2SLM
(AP-2SLM) can be formulated as

$$\text{maximize } x \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} r_i a_i x_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i x_i + a_0} \quad \text{(AP-2SLM)}$$

subject to \( x \in D \)

where \( r_i \) and \( a_i \) represent \( r(i) \) and \( a(i) \) for simplicity.

An effective strategy for solving many assortment problems consists in considering revenue-ordered assortments, which are obtained by choosing a threshold \( \rho \) and selecting all the products with revenue at least \( \rho \). This strategy leads to an optimal algorithm for the assortment problem under the MNL. Unfortunately, it fails under the 2SLM because adding a highly attractive product may remove many dominated products whose revenues and utilities would lead to a higher revenue.

**Example 2** (Sub-Optimality of Revenue-Ordered Assortments). Consider a Threshold Luce model with \( X = \{1, 2, 3\} \), revenues \( r_1 = 88, r_2 = 47, r_3 = 46 \), attractiveness \( a_0 = 55, a_1 = 13, a_2 = 26, a_3 = 15 \) and \( t = 0.6 \). Then \( x \succ y \) iff \( a_x > 1.6 \ a_y \) which gives \( 2 \succ 1 \) and \( 2 \succ 3 \). Consider the sets \( S \subseteq X \) satisfying \( S = c(S) \):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( S )</th>
<th>( R(S) )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>{1}</td>
<td>16.824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>{2}</td>
<td>15.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>{3}</td>
<td>9.857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>{1,3}</td>
<td>22.096</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The optimal revenue is given by assortment \( \{1,3\} \), while the best revenue-ordered assortment under the 2SLM is \( S = \{1\} \), yielding almost 24% less revenue.

To solve problem AP-2SLM, consider first the \textbf{MaxAtt} problem defined over the same set of constraints. Given weights \( c_i \in \mathbb{R} \ (1 \leq i \leq n) \), the \textbf{MaxAtt} problem is defined as follows:

$$\text{maximize } x \sum_{i=1}^{n} c_i x_i \quad \text{(MaxAtt)}$$

subject to \( x \in D \)

We now show that (MaxAtt) can be reduced to the maximum weighted independent set problem in a directed acyclic graph with positive vertex weights. An independent set is a set of vertices \( I \) such that there is no edge connecting any two vertices in \( I \). The maximum weighted independent set problem (MWIS) can be stated as follows:

**Definition 3.** Maximum Weighted Independent Set Problem: Given a graph \( G = (V, E) \) with a weight function \( w : V \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \), find an independent set \( I^* \in \arg\max_{I \in \mathcal{I}} \sum_{i \in I} w(i) \), where \( \mathcal{I} \) is the set of all independent sets.
Recall that the dominance relation can be represented as a DAG $G$ which includes an arc $(u, v)$ whenever $u \succ v$. As a result, the condition $x \in D$ implies that any feasible solution to $(\text{MaxAtt})$ represents an independent set in $G$ and maximizing $\sum_{i=1}^{n} c_i x_i$ amounts to finding the independent set maximizing the sum of the weights. Since the dominance relation is a partial order, the DAG representing the dominance relation is a comparability graph. The following result is particularly useful.

**Theorem 1** (Möhring (1985)). The maximum weighted independent set is polynomially-solvable for comparability graphs with positive weights.

We are ready to present our first result.

**Lemma 1.** $(\text{MaxAtt})$ is polynomial-time solvable.

**Proof.** We first show that we can ignore those products with a negative weight. Let $\hat{X} = \{i \in X \mid c_i > 0\}$ and $\hat{D} = \{x \in \{0, 1\}^n \mid \forall s, t \in \hat{X}, s \succ t: x_s + x_t \leq 1\}$. Solving $(\text{MaxAtt})$ is equivalent to solving:

$$\begin{align*}
\text{maximize} & \quad \sum_{i \in \hat{X}} c_i x_i \\
\text{subject to} & \quad x \in \hat{D}
\end{align*}$$

Indeed, consider an optimal solution $x^*$ to Problem $(\text{MaxAtt})$ and assume that there exists $i \in X$ such that $c_i < 0$ and $x^*_i = 1$. Define $\hat{x}$ like $x^*$ but with $\hat{x}_i = 0$. $\hat{x}$ has a strictly greater value for the objective function in Reduced $(\text{MaxAtt})$ than $x^*$ has, and is feasible since setting a component to zero cannot violate any constraint (i.e., $\hat{x} \in \hat{D}$). This contradicts the optimality of $x^*$. Now Problem Reduced $(\text{MaxAtt})$ can be reduced to solving an instance of Problem MWIS in a DAG with positive weights that corresponds to the dominance relation. This DAG is a comparability graph and the result follows from Theorem 1.

The next step in solving the assortment problem under the 2SLM relies on a result by Megiddo Megiddo (1979). Let $D$ be a domain defined by some set of constraints and consider Problem A

$$\begin{align*}
\text{maximize} & \quad \sum_{i=1}^{n} c_i x_i \\
\text{subject to} & \quad x \in D
\end{align*}$$

and its associated Problem B:

$$\begin{align*}
\text{maximize} & \quad \frac{a_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i x_i}{b_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{n} b_i x_i} \\
\text{subject to} & \quad x \in D
\end{align*}$$

Using this notation, Megiddo’s theorem can be stated as follows.
Theorem 2 (Megiddo (1979)). If Problem A is solvable within \( O(p(n)) \) comparisons and \( O(q(n)) \) additions, then Problem B is solvable in \( O(p(n)(q(n) + p(n))) \) time.

We are now in position to state our main theorem of this section.

Theorem 3. The assortment problem under the Two-Stage Luce model is polynomial-time solvable.

Proof. Recall that the assortment problem under the 2SLM (AP-2SLM) can be formulated as

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{maximize} & \quad \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} r_i a_i x_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i x_i + a_0} \\
\text{subject to} & \quad x \in D (5)
\end{align*}
\]

where \( D = \{ x \in \{0, 1\}^n \mid \forall s \succ t : x_s + x_t \leq 1 \} \).

The problem of maximizing the numerator in (5) is exactly the MaxAtt problem. By Lemma 1, this is polynomial-time solvable. Now observe that (5) (i.e., problem AP-2SLM) can be seen as a Problem B. Therefore, by Theorem 2, the assortment problem under the 2SLM is solvable in polynomial time.

In addition to solving the assortment problem under the 2SLM, Theorem 3 is interesting in that it solves the assortment problem under a Multinomial Logit with a specific class of constraints. It can be contrasted with the results by Davis, Gallego, and Topaloglu (2013), where feasible assortments satisfy a set of totally unimodular constraints. They show that the resulting problem can be solved as a linear program. However, the 2SLM introduces constraints that are not necessarily totally unimodular as we now show.

Example 3. Consider \( X = \{1, 2, 3, 4\} \) and \( 1 \succ 3, 1 \succ 4, 2 \succ 3, 2 \succ 4, \) and \( 3 \succ 4 \). The constraint matrix that defines the feasible space (\( D \)) for this instance is:

\[
M = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 1
\end{bmatrix}
\]

where each row represents a constraint \( x_u + x_v \leq 1 \), meaning that just one end of the edge can be selected at the time. Camion (1965) proved that \( M \) is totally unimodular if and only if, for every (square) Eulerian submatrix \( A \) of \( M \), \( \sum_{i,j} a_{ij} \equiv 0 \) (mod 4). Consider the sub-matrix corresponding to the first, second, and fifth rows and the first, third, and fourth columns

\[
N = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & 1 & 0 \\
1 & 0 & 1 \\
0 & 1 & 1
\end{bmatrix}
\]
Matrix $N$ is eulerian (The sums of every element on each row or on each column is a multiple of 2). But the sum of all elements of $N$ is $6 \not\equiv 0 \pmod{4}$ and hence $M$ is not totally unimodular.

We close this section by explaining how our results can be extended to a more general setting. Gallego, Ratliff, and Shebalov (2014) proposed the general attraction model (GAM) to describe customer behaviour, that alleviates some deficiencies of the MNL. More specifically, the intuition behind this choice model is that whenever a product is not offered, then its absence can potentially increase the probability of the no-purchase alternative, as consumers can potentially look for the product elsewhere, or at a later time. To achieve this effect, for each product $j$ the model considers two different weights: $v_j$ and $w_j$, usually with $0 \leq w_j \leq v_j$. If product $j$ is offered, then its preference weight is $v_j$. But if $j$ is not offered, then the preference weight of the outside option is increased by $w_j$. For all $j \in X$, let $\tilde{v}_j = v_j - w_j$ and $\tilde{v}_0 = v_0 + \sum_{k \in X} w_k$. Using this notation, the probabilities associated with the GAM model can be recovered by means of the following equation:

$$
\rho(j, S) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{v_j}{\sum_{i \in S} \tilde{v}_j + \tilde{v}_0} & \text{if } j \in S, \\
0 & \text{if } j \notin S.
\end{cases} \tag{6}
$$

Observe that the resulting assortment problem will has the same functional form than problem AP-2SLM, with a slight modification on the coefficients in the denominator. Thus, we can apply the same solution technique described in Theorem 3 to find the optimal assortment for the GAM.

### 6 The Capacitated Assortment Problem

In many applications, the number of products in an assortment is limited, giving rise to capacitated assortment problems. Let $C$ ($1 \leq C \leq n$) be the maximum number of products allowed in an assortment. The Capacitated Assortment Problem under the Two-Stage Luce Model (C2SLMAP) is given by

$$
\max x \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{r_i a_i x_i}{a_i x_i + a_0} \quad \text{subject to} \quad x \in \mathcal{D}_C \tag{C2SLMAP}
$$

where $\mathcal{D}_C = \{x \in \{0,1\}^n \mid \forall (s,t) \in \mathcal{R} \quad x_s + x_t \leq 1 \land \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \leq C\}$. As before, it is useful to define its capacitated maximum-attractiveness counterpart (C-MaxAtt), i.e.,

$$
\max x \sum_{i=1}^{n} c_i x_i \quad \text{subject to} \quad x \in \mathcal{D}_C \tag{C-MaxAtt}
$$

This section first proves that the capacitated assortment problem under the 2SLM is NP-hard. The reduction uses the Maximum Weighted Budgeted Independent Set (MWBIS) problem proposed by Bandyapadhyay (2014) which amounts to finding a maximum weighted independent set of size not greater than $C$. Kalra et al. (2017) showed that Problem (MWBIS) is NP-hard for bipartite graphs.
Theorem 4. Problem (C2SLMAP) is NP-hard (under Turing reductions).

It is interesting to mention that Problem (C-MaxAtt) is equivalent to finding an anti-chain of maximum weight among those of cardinality at most \( C \). This problem (MWLA) was proposed by Shum and Trotter (1996) and its complexity was left open, but the above results show that it is also NP-hard. Bandyapadhyay (2014) studied Problem (MWBIS) for various types of graphs (e.g., trees and forests), but the dominance relation of the 2SLM can never be a tree since it is transitive (unless we consider a graph with a single vertex).

In light of this NP-hardness result, the rest of this section presents polynomial-time algorithms for two special cases of the dominance relation.

6.1 The Two-Stage Luce model over Tree-Induced Dominance Relations

Let \( R_\succ \) be the transitive reduction of the irreflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive relation \( \succ \). This section considers the capacitated assortment problem when the relation \( R_\succ \) can be represented as a tree. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the tree contains all products. Otherwise, we can add another product with zero weight that dominates all original products. This new product will be the root of the tree and the products not in the original tree will be the children of the root. Similarly, the same transformation applies to the case when \( R_\succ \) is a forest. Here all the trees in the forest will be children of the new product.

We show how to solve Problem (C-MaxAtt). The result follows again by applying Megiddo’s theorem. The first step of the algorithm simply removes all products with negative weight: Their children can be added to the parent of the deleted vertex. The main step then solves (C-MaxAtt) bottom-up using dynamic programming from the leaves. For simplicity, we present the recurrence relations to compute the weight of the optimal assortment. It is easy to recover the optimal assortment itself. The recurrence relations compute two functions:

1. \( A(k, c) \) which returns the weight of an optimal assortment using product \( k \) and its descendants in the tree representation of \( R_\succ \) for a capacity \( c \);
2. \( A^+(S, c) \) which, given a set \( S \) of vertices that are children of a vertex \( k \), returns the weight of an optimal assortment using the products in \( S \) and their descendants for a capacity \( c \).

The key intuition behind the recurrence is as follows. If \( v \) is a vertex and \( v_1 \) and \( v_2 \) are two of its children, \( v_1 \) does not dominate \( v_2 \) or any of its descendants. Hence, it suffices to compute the best assortments producing \( A(v_1, 0), \ldots, A(v_1, C) \) and \( A(v_2, 0), \ldots, A(v_2, C) \) and to combine them optimally. The recurrence relations are defined as follows (\( v \in X \) and \( 1 \leq c \leq C \)):

\[
A(v, 0) = 0; \\
A(v, c) = \max(c_v, A^+(\text{children}(v), c));
\]
\[ A^+(\emptyset, 0) = 0; \]
\[ A^+(S, c) = \max_{n_1, n_2 \geq 0 \atop n_1 + n_2 = c} A^+(S \setminus \{e\}, n_1) + A(e, n_2) \quad \text{where} \quad e = \arg\max_{i \in S} c_i. \]

where \( \text{children}(p) \) denotes the children of product \( p \) in the tree. Note that \( A^+(S, c) \) is computed recursively to obtain the best assortment from the products in \( S \) and their descendants. Using these recurrence relation, the following Theorem follows:

**Theorem 5.** Let \( > \) a dominance relation whose relation \( R_\succ \) is a tree containing all products. The capacitated assortment problem under the 2SLM and \( > \) is polynomial-time solvable.

### 6.2 The Attractiveness-Correlated Two-Stage Luce model

The second special case considers a dominance relation that is correlated with attractiveness.

**Definition 4 (Attractiveness-Correlated Two-Stage Luce model).** A Two-Stage Luce model is attractiveness-correlated if the dominance relation satisfies the following two conditions:

1. If \( x \succ y \), then \( a_x > a_y \).
2. If \( x \succ y \) and \( a_z > a_x \), then \( z \succ y \).

The first condition simply expresses that product \( x \) can only dominate product \( y \) if the attractiveness of \( x \) is greater than the attractiveness of \( y \). The second condition ensures that, if \( x \) dominates \( y \), then any product whose attractiveness is greater than \( x \) also dominates \( y \). The induced dominance relation is irreflexive, anti-symmetric, and transitive. A particular case of this model, is the Threshold Luce model.

When customers follow the Threshold Luce model, they form their consideration sets based on the attractiveness of products. Without loss of generality, we can assume \( a_1 \geq a_2 \geq \ldots \geq a_n \), unless stated otherwise. For a set \( S \), the associated consideration set \( c(S) \) may be a proper subset of \( S \), but for the purpose of assortment optimization, we don’t have incentives to offer sets including products that are not even consider by customers, so we can restrict our search for optimal solutions to sets where \( c(S) = S \). A necessary and sufficient condition for this to happen is \( \frac{\max_{i \in S} a_i}{\min_{i \in S} a_i} \leq 1 + \epsilon \). Meaning that largest ratio between attractiveness is not greater than \( 1 + \epsilon \), so no dominance relation appears.

The firm now needs to carefully balance the inclusion of high-attractiveness products and their prices to maximize the revenue. In the following example we show that revenue ordered assortments are not optimal under the Threshold Luce Model. In fact, this strategy can be arbitrarily bad.

**Example 4 (Revenue ordered assortments are not optimal).** Consider the following product configuration. Let \( N + 1 \) products, with prices \( p_1 \) for the first product, and \( \alpha p_1 \) for the rest of them, with \( \alpha < 1 \). The attractiveness for all products is \( a_1 \) for the first product and \( \gamma a_1 \) for all the rest,
such as in the presence of product 1, all the rest of the products are ignored. To complete the set up, let $a_0$ the attractiveness of the outside option. The best revenue ordered assortment is to consider product 1, given a revenue of:

$$R' = R(\{1\}) = \frac{p_1a_1}{a_1 + a_0}$$

But, if $N$ is big enough (at least bigger than $\frac{1}{\alpha\gamma}$), is more profitable to show $S_N = X \setminus \{1\}$, resulting in a revenue of:

$$R^* = R(S_N) = \frac{N \cdot \alpha p_1 \gamma a_1}{N \cdot \alpha \gamma a_1 + a_0}$$

Now, if we calculate the ratio if this two values, $R'$ and $R^*$ and let $N$ tend to infinity we have:

$$\frac{R'}{R^*} = \lim_{N \to \infty} \frac{\frac{p_1a_1}{a_1 + a_0}}{\frac{N \cdot \alpha p_1 \gamma a_1}{N \cdot \alpha \gamma a_1 + a_0}}$$

$$\frac{R'}{R^*} = \lim_{N \to \infty} \frac{\frac{p_1 a_1}{a_1 + a_0}}{\frac{N \cdot \alpha \gamma a_1 + a_0}{N \cdot \alpha p_1 \gamma a_1}} = \frac{a_1}{a_1 + a_0}$$

(7)

Observe that this last expression is the market share of offering just product 1, which can be arbitrarily bad by either making $a_1$ as small as desired, or making the outside option more attractive.

The capacitated assortment optimization can be solved in polynomial time under the Attractiveness-Correlated Two-Stage Luce model. Consider an assortment whose product with the largest attractiveness is $k$. This assortment cannot contain any product dominated by $k$. Moreover, if $k_1$ and $k_2$ are two other products in this assortment, then $k_1$ cannot dominate $k_2$ since $k$ would also dominate $k_2$. As a result, consider the set

$$X_k = \{i \in X \mid a_i \leq a_k \land k \not\sim_i\}.$$ 

No product in $X_k$ dominates any other product in $X_k$ and hence the C2SLMAP reduces to a traditional assortment problem under the MNL. This idea is formalized in Algorithm 1, where CMLMAP is a traditional algorithm for the MNL. The algorithm considers each product in turn and the products that it does not dominate and applies a traditional capacitated assortment optimization under the MNL. The best such assortment is the solution to the capacitated assortment under the attractiveness-correlated 2SLM.
Algorithm 1: Capacitated Assortment Optimization under the Attractiveness-Correlated 2SLM.

**Data:** $X, \succ, r, a$

**Result:** Optimal Assortment $S^*$

$R(S^*) = 0$ for $k = 1, \ldots, n$ do

$X_k = \{i \in X | a_i \leq a_k \& k \not\succ i\}$

$S_k = \text{CMLMAP}(X_k, r, a)$

if $R(S_k) > R(S^*)$ then

$S^* = S_k$

end

end

return $S^*$

\textbf{Theorem 6.} \textit{C2SLMAP} can be solved in polynomial time for Attractiveness-Correlated instances.

\textit{Proof.} To show correctness, it suffices to show that the optimal assortment must be a subset of one of the $X_k$ ($1 \leq k \leq n$). Let $A$ be the optimal assortment and assume that $k$ is its product with the largest attractiveness (break ties randomly). $A$ must be included in $X_k$ since otherwise it would contain a product $x$ such that $k \succ x$ (contradicting feasibility) or such that $a(x) > a(k)$ (contradicting our hypothesis). The correctness then follows since there is no dominance relationship between any two elements in each of $X_k$. The claim of polynomial-time solvability follows from the availability of polynomial-time algorithms for the assortment problem under the MNL and the fact that are exactly $n$ calls to such an algorithm. \hfill \Box

7 Joint Assortment and Pricing under the Threshold Luce model

The previous sections provides solutions to the Assortment Optimization problem under the Two-Stage Luce model. This section aims at determining how to assign prices to products in order to maximise the expected revenue. It studies the Joint Assortment and Pricing Problem under the Threshold Luce model, by making the attractiveness of each product dependent upon its price. Let $p = (p_1, \ldots, p_n)$ be the price vector, where such that $p_i \in \mathbb{R}_+ \cup \{\infty\}$ represents the price of product $i$. Since the price will affect the attractiveness $a_i$ of product $i$, the presentation makes this dependency explicit by writing $a_i(p_i)$ whose form in this paper is specified by

$$a_i(p_i) = \exp(u_i - p_i)$$

where $u_i$ is the \textit{intrinsic utility} of product $i$ and the value $v_i = u_i - p_i$ is called the \textit{net utility} of product $i$. Assigning an infinite price to a product is equivalent to not offering the product, as the attractiveness, and therefore the probability of selecting the product, becomes 0. Without loss of generality, products are indexed in a decreasing order by intrinsic utility.
Table 1: Summary of utilities, prices and attractiveness for the two proposed scenarios.

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(\ln(10))</td>
<td>(\ln(3))</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>(\ln(4))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>(\ln(8))</td>
<td>(\ln(3))</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>(\ln(4))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>(\ln(6))</td>
<td>(\ln(3))</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(\ln(3))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>(\ln(3))</td>
<td>(\ln(3))</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(\ln(2))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2: The DAG for the first scenario where all prices are fixed to \(\ln(3)\) and the threshold is \(t = 0.5\). Product 1 dominates products 3 and 4, and product 2 dominates product 4.

Figure 3: The DAG for the second scenario where all prices are fixed to \((\ln(4), \ln(4), \ln(3), \ln(2))\) and the threshold is \(t = 0.5\). Only product 1 dominates product 4.

The following definition is an extension of the definition of a consideration set given an assortment \(S\) when each product \(i\) has a price \(p_i\).

**Definition 5.** Given an assortment \(S\), a price vector \(p = (p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n)\) and a threshold \(t\), the consideration set \(c(S, p)\) for the Threshold Luce model is defined as:

\[
c(S, p) = \{ j \in S \mid \not\exists i \in S : a_i(p_i) > (1 + t)a_j(p_j) \}. \tag{9}
\]

The influence of the price vector over the dominance relations is given by the following example:

**Example 5.** [Price effect on the dominance relation] Consider the Threshold Luce model defined over \(X = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}\) with utilities \(u_1 = \ln(10), u_2 = \ln(8), u_3 = \ln(6)\) and \(u_4 = \ln(3)\), and consider first a scenario where all products have the same price \(p_i = \ln(3)\) \(\forall i = 1, \ldots, 4\). Consider also a second scenario with prices equal to \(p'_1 = \ln(4), p'_2 = \ln(4), p'_3 = \ln(3)\) and \(p'_4 = \ln(2)\). For a threshold \(t = 0.5\), we have that \(i \succ j\) if \(a_i(p_i) > 1.5 a_j(p_j)\). A table summarizing the utilities, prices, and attractiveness for both scenarios is given in Table 1 and the DAGs depicting the dominance relations for the two scenarios are given in Figures 2 and 3.
It is also necessary to update the definition of $\rho$ in Definition 1, since it now depends on the price of all products in the assortment. The definition of $\rho : X \cup \{0\} \times 2^X \times (\mathbb{R}_+ \cup \infty)^n \rightarrow [0,1]$ becomes:

$$\rho(i,S,p) = \begin{cases} \frac{a_i(p_i)}{\sum_{j \in c(S,p)} a_j(p_j) + a_0}, & \text{if } i \in c(S,p), \\ 0, & \text{if } i \notin c(S,p). \end{cases}$$ (10)

where $a_0$ is the attractiveness of the outside option.

The expected revenue (ER) of an assortment $S \subseteq X$ and a price vector $p \in \mathbb{R}^n_+$ is given by

$$R(S,p) = \sum_{i \in c(S,p)} \rho(i,S,p)p_i.$$ (ER)

A pair $(S,p)$ with $S \subseteq X$ and $p \in (\mathbb{R}_+ \cup \infty)^n$ is valid if $S = \{i : p_i < \infty\}$ and $c(S,p) = S$. Let $\mathcal{V}$ be the set of all valid pairs $(S,p)$. Observe that one can always restrict the search for optimal solutions to $\mathcal{V}$. Indeed, all dominated products can be given an infinite price and removing them from the original assortment yields the exact same revenue.

The Joint Assortment and Pricing problem aims at finding a set $S^*$ and a price vector $p^*$ satisfying

$$(S^*,p^*) \in \arg\max_{(S,p) \in \mathcal{V}} R(S,p)$$

and yielding an optimal revenue of

$$R^* = R(S^*,p^*).$$

First observe that the strategy used to solve this problem under the multinomial logit does not carry over to the Threshold Luce Model. Under the multinomial logit, the optimal solution for the joint assortment and pricing problem is a fixed adjusted margin policy (Wang, 2012) which, for equal price sensitivities and normalised costs, translates to a fixed price policy. As shown in Li and Huh (2011), the optimal solution for the pricing problem under the multinomial logit can be expressed in closed form using the Lambert function $W(x) : [0, \infty) \rightarrow [0, \infty)$ which is defined as the unique function satisfying:

$$x = W(x)e^{W(x)} \quad \forall x \in [0, \infty).$$ (11)

Using this function, the optimal revenue can be expressed as:

$$R^* = W\left(\frac{\sum_{i \in X} \exp(u_i - 1)}{a_0}\right)$$ (12)

The prices are all equal and satisfy: $p_i = 1 + R^* \quad \forall i \in X$. The following example shows that fixed-price policy is not optimal under the Threshold Luce Model.

**Example 6 (Fixed-Price policy is not optimal).** Consider 11 products with product 1 having utility $u = 2$ and all remaining 10 products having utility $u' = 1$. Consider $a_0 = 1$ and $t = 1$. Observe that, for any fixed price, product 1 always dominates the other 10 products having lower utility, as
\[ \exp(u - u') = \exp(1) = e > (1 + t) = 2. \]
Therefore, the optimal revenue for a fixed price strategy is:
\[ R_{fixed} = W\left(\frac{\exp(u - 1)}{a_0}\right) = W(e) = 1. \]

As a result, the 10 lower utility products are completely ignored and only product 1 contributes to the revenue.

Consider the following price scheme now: let the price for product 1 be \( p = 1.8 \) and let the price be \( p' = 1.4 \) for the remaining products. Product 1 does not dominate any other product now. Indeed, for any \( 1 < k \leq 11 \),
\[ \frac{a_1}{a_k} = \exp((u - p) - (u' - p')) = \exp((2 - 1.8) - (1 - 1.4)) \approx 1.822 < 1 + t = 2, \]
which yields a revenue of:
\[
R' = \frac{p \cdot \exp(u - p) + 10 \cdot p' \cdot \exp(u' - p')}{\exp(u - p) + 10 \cdot \exp(u' - p') + a_0} = \frac{1.8 \cdot \exp(2 - 1.8) + 10 \cdot 1.4 \exp(1 - 1.4)}{\exp(2 - 1.8) + 10 \cdot \exp(1 - 1.4) + 1} \approx 1.298,
\]
This pricing scheme improves upon the fixed-price policy, yielding a revenue almost 30% higher.

The intuition behind this example is as follows: For a fixed price strategy, the only factor affecting dominance is the intrinsic utilities because the prices vanish when calculating the ratio between two attractiveness. This means that the solution can potentially miss the benefits of low attractiveness products which are dominated by the most attractive product.

It is thus important to understand the structure of an optimal solution for the Joint Assortment and Pricing problem under the Threshold Luce model. The first result states that, for any optimal solution \((S^*, p^*)\), all product prices are greater or equal than \(R^*\), where \(R^*\) denotes the revenue achieved at optimality.

**Proposition 1.** In any optimal solution \((S^*, p^*)\), for all \(i \in S^*\), \(p^*_i \geq R^*\).

The proof is by contradiction: Removing products with a price lower than \(R^*\) yields a greater revenue. The next proposition characterises the optimal assortment of products of any optimal solution to the Joint Assortment and Pricing problem. Recall that the products are indexed by decreasing utility \(u_i\). Thus, the set of products \([k] := \{1, \ldots, k\}\), (with \(0 < k \leq n\)) is said to be an intrinsic utility ordered set. The following proposition holds:

**Proposition 2.** Let \((S^*, p^*)\) denote an optimal solution. Then \(S^* = [k]\) for some \(k \leq n\).

The following Lemma due to Wang and Sahin (2018) is useful to prove some of the upcoming propositions. For completeness, its proof is also in Appendix A.

**Lemma 2** (Lemma 1, Wang and Sahin (2018)). Let \(H(p_i, p_j) := p_i \cdot \exp(u_i - p_i) + p_j \cdot \exp(u_j - p_j)\), where \(\exp(u_i - p_i) + \exp(u_j - p_j) = T\). Then, \(H(p_i, p_j)\) is strictly unimodal with respect to \(p_i\) or \(p_j\), and it achieves the maximum at the following point:
\[
p_i^* = p_j^* = \ln((\exp(u_i) + \exp(u_j))/T) \tag{13}
\]
Observe that setting the price of a product to $\infty$ is equivalent to not showing it to consumers. By Proposition 2, one can always find an optimal solution that is intrinsic utility ordered. Given a price vector $p \in \mathbb{R}^n$, let $\gamma(p) : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow [n]$ be defined as $\gamma(p) = \{\max_{i \in [n]} i \text{ s.t } p_i < \infty\}$. Intuitively, this is the last non-infinite price. Proposition 3 shows that, at optimality, the finite prices are non-increasing in $i$, meaning that lower prices are assigned to lower utility products.

**Proposition 3.** The prices at an optimal solution $(S^*, p^*)$ satisfy $p^*_i \geq p^*_{i+1} \ \forall i \in [\gamma(p) - 1]$.

Moreover, if $i, j \in S^*$ satisfy $u_i = u_j$, then $p^*_i = p^*_j$.

Recall that the net utility of product $i$ was defined as: $v_i = u_i - p_i$. The following proposition shows that at optimality, net utility follows the same order as intrinsic utility.

**Proposition 4.** Let $p^*$ be the price of an optimal solution of the Joint Assortment and Pricing Problem. The following condition holds: $u_i - p^*_i \geq u_{i+1} - p^*_{i+1} \ \forall i \in [\gamma(p) - 1]$.

The above propositions make it possible to filter out non-efficient assortments and prices by restricting the search space to intrinsic utility ordered assortments and providing insights on how the optimal solution behaves regarding prices and their relation with utilities. Based on these propositions, the joint assortment and pricing optimisation problem for the TLM can be written in a more succinct way. From Proposition 2, the solution is an intrinsic utility ordered set $S_k = [k]$ for some $k \leq n$. Suppose there exists an optimal solution in the form $(S_k, p)$ for a fixed value $k$. In that case, recall that it is sufficient to restrict to valid pairs $(S_k, p)$, meaning that $c(S_k, p) = S_k$.

Consider a fixed $k \leq n$. By Proposition 4, at optimality, $u_i - p_i \geq u_j - p_j \ \forall 1 \leq i < j \leq k$. Therefore, the condition that $c(S_k, p) = S_k$ can be written as

$$g_{ij}(p) := \exp(u_i - p_i) - (1 + t) \cdot \exp(u_j - p_j) \leq 0, \ \forall 1 \leq i < j \leq k \tag{14}$$

As a result, the joint $k$-assortment and pricing optimisation problem for the TLM (JAPTLM-k), which aims at finding an optimal assortment $S_k$ of size $k$ with $k \leq n$, can be written as:

$$\begin{align*}
\text{maximize } & R^{(k)}(p) := \frac{\sum_{i \in S_k} p_i \cdot \exp(u_i - p_i)}{\sum_{i \in S_k} \exp(u_i - p_i) + a_0} \\
\text{subject to } & g_{ij}(p) \leq 0, \ \forall 1 \leq i < j \leq k
\end{align*} \tag{JAPTLM-k}$$

Note that, if $\exp(u_1 - u_k) \leq (1 + t)$, then the solution is the same as the unconstrained case, because any fixed price can be assigned without creating dominances. Hence, the optimal revenue $R^{(k)}$ can be calculated using equation (12), and all prices are equal to $1 + R^{(k)}$. On the other hand, if $\exp(u_1 - u_k) > 1 + t$, as in Example 6, the prices need to be adjusted in order to avoid dominances.

The next theorem is the main result of this section.

**Theorem 7.** Problem JAPTLM-k can be solved in polynomial time.

The intuition behind the proof is based on Proposition 4 and the study of the Lagrangean relaxation of problem (JAPTLM-k). Observe that, since $u_i - p_i \geq u_j - p_j \ (i \leq j)$ at optimality,
then the largest ratio between attractiveness is obtained for products 1 and $k$. This ratio can also occur for more products but only if they have the same net utility as products 1 or $k$. Thus, it must be the case that there are non-negative integers $k_1$ and $k_2$ with $k_1 + k_2 \leq k$, such that letting $I_1 = [k_1]$ and $I_2 = \{k - k_2 + 1, k - k_2 + 2, \ldots, k\}$, the set of constraints $C(k_1, k_2) = \{g_{ij}(p) \mid i \in I_1, j \in I_2\}$ are satisfied at equality for the optimal solution (see the proof in Appendix A for details). Since it is only necessary to study a polynomial number of combinations of constraints satisfied at equality and, for each one of those combinations a closed form solution is provided, the result follows.

For the non-trivial case with $\exp(u_1 - u_k) > 1 + t$, where a fixed price fails to be optimal, the prices need to be adjusted in order to avoid the dominances. Let $\mathbf{R}^{(k)}$ and $\mathbf{p}^{(k)}$ be the optimal revenue and price vector. The following Lemma characterizes the structure of the optimal solution for problem JAPTLM-$k$.

**Lemma 3.** The optimal solution to problem (JAPTLM-$k$) is either the same as the unconstrained case (i.e. fixed price, in the case that $\exp(u_1 - u_k) \leq (1 + t)$) or the following holds at optimality:

$$
\frac{a_1(p_i)}{a_k(p_k)} = 1 + t.
$$

Moreover, there are non-negative integers $k_1^*, k_2^*$, with $k_1^* + k_2^* \leq k$ such that:

$$
\mathbf{R}^{(k)} = W \left[ \left( k_1^* + \frac{k_2^* t}{1+t} \right) \cdot \exp \left( \frac{(1+t) \sum_{i \in I} u_i + \sum_{i \in I} u_i + k_1^* \ln(1+t)}{k_1^* (1+t) + k_2^*} - 1 \right) + \sum_{i \in I_k} \exp(u_i - 1) \right],
$$

where $I_1 = [k_1^*]$, $I_2 = \{k - k_2^* + 1, k - k_2^* + 2, \ldots, k\}$ and $I_k = [k] \setminus (I_1 \cup I_2)$. The optimal prices can be obtained as follows:

$$
\mathbf{p}_i^{(k)} = \begin{cases} 
1 + \mathbf{R}^{(k)} + u_i - \frac{(1+t) \sum_{i \in I_1} u_i + \sum_{i \in I} u_i + k_1^* \ln(1+t)}{k_1^* (1+t) + k_2^*} + \ln(1+t) & \text{if } i \in I_1, \\
1 + \mathbf{R}^{(k)} + u_i - \frac{(1+t) \sum_{i \in I} u_i + k_1^* \ln(1+t)}{k_1^* (1+t) + k_2^*} + \ln(1+t) & \text{if } i \in I_2, \\
1 + \mathbf{R}^{(k)} + u_i & \text{if } i \in I_k.
\end{cases}
$$

Let TLM-Opt($X, u, a_0, k$) be the procedure to obtain the optimal solution for problem (JAPTLM-$k$). Using TLM-Opt($X, u, a_0, k$) at most $n$ times (once for each $k \leq n$) to obtain the assortment and prices yielding the highest $\mathbf{R}^{(k)}$, one can find the optimal assortment and price vector for any given instance. Its intuition is to mimic the optimal strategy for the regular MNL (Fixed-Price Policy) as much as possible. However, given that it needs to accommodate prices in order to avoid dominances, the algorithm adjusts prices for the higher intrinsic utility products (making prices larger, hence less attractive) and reduces the price of lower intrinsic utility ones, making them more attractive for customers and preventing them from being dominated. This allows the optimal strategy to have an edge over strategies ignoring the Threshold induced dominances, such as Fixed-Price Policy and, to a lesser extent, the Quasi-Same Price (Wang and Sahin, 2018). The Quasi-Same Price policy only adjusts the price of the lowest attractiveness product, instead of adjusting...
both extremes of the attractiveness spectrum and potentially multiple products.

8 Conclusion and Future Work

This paper studies the assortment optimization problem under the Two-Stage Luce model (2SLM), a discrete choice model introduced by Echenique and Saito (2018) that generalizes the standard multinomial logit model (MNL) with a dominance relation and may violate regularity. The paper proved that the assortment problem under the 2SLM can be solved in polynomial time. The paper also considered the capacitated assortment problem under the 2SLM and proved that the problem becomes NP-hard in this setting. We also provide polynomial-time algorithms for special cases of the capacitated problem when (1) the dominance relation is utility-correlated and when (2) its transitive reduction is a forest. We also provide an Appendix showing numerical experiments to highlight the performance of the proposed algorithms against classical strategies used in the literature.

There are at least five interesting avenues for future research. First, one may wish to study how to generalize the 2SLM further while still keeping the assortment problem solvable in polynomial time. For example, one can try to check whether there exists a model that unifies the 2SLM and the elegant work in Davis, Gallego, and Topaloglu (2013) where the assortment problem is still solvable in polynomial time. Second, given that the capacitated version of the 2SLM is NP-hard under Turing reductions (Theorem 4), it is interesting to see whether there exist good approximation algorithms for this problem. Third, one can explore different forms of dominance. For example, one may consider dominances specified by a discrete relation or a continuous functional form between products. Fourth, one can try to generalise our results for the Joint Assortment Pricing Problem under the Threshold Luce model to a more general setting, where price sensitivities depend on each product. Finally, one can try to mix attention models with dominance relations, meaning that a customer first perceives a subset of the products, dictated by an attention filter, and then filter the products even more using dominance relations.

9 Acknowledgements

We thanks Yuval Filmus for his helpful insights leading us to find useful literature on this topic. Thanks are also due to Guillermo Gallego for suggesting extending our assortment results to the GAM model, and to Flavia Bonomo for relevant discussions.

References


Davis, J.; Gallego, G.; and Topaloglu, H. 2013. Assortment planning under the multinomial logit model with totally unimodular constraint structures. *Department of IEOR, Columbia University.*


Jagabathula, S., and Vulcano, G. 2015. A model to estimate individual preferences using panel data. *Available at SSRN 2560994*.


Kouvelis, P.; Xiao, Y.; and Yang, N. 2015. PBM competition in pharmaceutical supply chain:


A Proofs

In this section we provide the proofs missing from the main text.

Proof of Theorem 4. The proof considers four problems:

1. Problem (MWBISBP): Maximum weighted independent set of size at most $C$ for bipartite graphs.

2. Problem (MWEBISBP): Maximum weighted independent set of size equal to $C$ for bipartite graphs.

3. Problem (EC2SLMAP): Optimal assortment under the General Luce model of size $C$.

4. Problem (C2SLMAP): Optimal capacitated assortment under the Two-Stage Luce model of size at most $C$.

The proof shows that Problems (MWEBISBP), (EC2SLMAP), and (C2SLMAP) are NP-hard, using the NP-hardness of Problem (MWBISBP) (Kalra et al., 2017) as a starting point.

First observe that Problem (MWEBISBP) is NP-hard under Turing reductions. Indeed, Problem (MWEBISBP) can be reduced to solving $C$ instances of Problem (MWEBISBP) with budget $c$ ($1 \leq c \leq C$).

We now show that Problem (EC2SLMAP) is NP-hard. Consider Problem (MWEBISBP) over a bipartite graph $G = (V = V_1 \cup V_2, E)$, where $V_1 \cap V_2 = \emptyset$, every edge $(v_1, v_2) \in E$ satisfies $v_1 \in V_1$ and $v_2 \in V_2$, $w_v$ is the weight of vertex $v$, and $C$ is the budget. We show that Problem (MWEBISBP) over this bipartite graph can be polynomially reduced to Problem (EC2SLMAP). The reduction assigns each vertex $v$ to a product with $a(v) = 1$ and $r_v = w_v$, sets $a_0 = 0$, and has a capacity $C$. Moreover, the reduction uses the following dominance relation: $v_1 \succ v_2$ iff $(v_1, v_2) \in E$. This dominance relation is irreflexive, anti-symmetric, and transitive, since the graph is bipartite. A solution to Problem (MWEBISBP) is a feasible solution to Problem (EC2SLMAP), since the independent set cannot contain two vertices $v_1, v_2$ with $v_1 \succ v_2$ by construction. Similarly, a feasible assortment is an independent set, since the assortment cannot select two vertices $v_1 \in V_1$ and $v_2 \in V_2$ with $(v_1, v_2) \in E$, since $v_1 \succ v_2$. The objective function of Problem (EC2SLMAP) reduces to maximizing

$$\frac{1}{C} \sum_{v \in V} r_v x_v$$

which is equivalent to maximizing $\sum_{v \in V} r_v x_v$ since exactly $C$ products will be selected by every feasible assortment. The result follows by the NP-hardness of Problem (MWEBISBP).

Finally, Problem (C2SLMAP) is NP-hard under Turing reductions. Indeed, Problem (C2SLMAP) can be reduced to solving $C$ instances of Problem (EC2SLMAP) with capacity $c$ ($1 \leq c \leq C$).

Proof of Theorem 5 By Theorem 2, it suffices to show that Problem (C-MaxAtt) is solved by the recurrences in polynomial time. The correctness of recurrence $A(v, c)$ comes from the fact that vertex $v$ dominates all its descendants and cannot be present in any assortment featuring any of them. The correctness of recurrence $A^+(S, c)$ follows from the fact that $e$ is not dominated by, and
does not dominate, any element in \( S \), since they are all children of the same node. This also holds for the descendants of \( e \) and the descendants of the elements in \( S \). Hence, the optimal assortment is obtained by splitting the capacity \( c \) into \( n_1 \) and \( n_2 \) and merging the best assortment for \( A^+(S,n_1) \) and \( A(e,n_2) \) for some \( n_1, n_2 \geq 0 \) summing to \( c \). The recurrences can be solved in polynomial time since the computation for each vertex \( v \) and capacity \( c \) takes \( O(n^2 C^2) \) time, giving an overall time complexity of \( O(n^2 C^2) \).

Proof of Proposition 1. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose \( p_i^* < R^* \) for some \( i \in S \), then \( \hat{S} = S^* \setminus \{i\} \) has better revenue than the optimal solution if we keep the same prices and \( p_i^* < R^* \). Indeed, let us calculate \( R(\hat{S}) \):

\[
R(\hat{S}) = \frac{\sum_{j \in S^*} e^{u_j - p_j^*} \cdot p_j^*}{\sum_{j \in S^*} e^{u_j - p_j^*} + a_0} \cdot \left[ 1 + \frac{e^{u_i - p_i^*}}{\sum_{j \in S^*} e^{u_j - p_j^*} - e^{u_i - p_i^*} + a_0} \right] - \frac{e^{u_i - p_i^*} \cdot p_i^*}{\sum_{j \in S^*} e^{u_j - p_j^*} - e^{u_i - p_i^*} + a_0}
\]

\[
R(\hat{S}) = R^* \cdot \frac{e^{u_i - p_i^*}}{\sum_{j \in S^*} e^{u_j - p_j^*} - e^{u_i - p_i^*} + a_0} \cdot [R^* - p_i^*]
\]

Now \( \Gamma \) is positive because \( p_i^* < R^* \), but this implies \( R(\hat{S}) > R^* \), contradicting the optimality of \( R^* \).

Proof of Proposition 2. Let \( (S^*, p^*) \) be an optimal solution. We can assume that \( (S^*, p^*) \in \mathcal{V} \). We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there is a product \( i \) not included in the optimal solution and another product \( j \) with smaller intrinsic utility included in \( S^* \). We show that we can include product \( i \), and remove \( j \) and get a greater revenue. Let \( \hat{S} = (S^* \setminus \{j\}) \cup \{i\} \), be the set where we removed product \( j \), and included product \( i \). Let \( \hat{p}_i = u_i - u_j + p_j^* \), this means that the total attractiveness remains unchanged, and no new domination relations appear, given that product \( j \) already had the same level attractiveness that product \( i \) now has. Observe that given that \( u_i \geq u_j \), we have that \( \hat{p}_i \geq p_j^* \). Let us calculate \( R(\hat{S}, \hat{p}) \), where \( \hat{p} \) is the same as \( p^* \), but with the proposed changes in price:
\[ R(\hat{S}, \hat{p}) = \frac{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{S}} e^{u_k - \hat{p}_k} \cdot \hat{p}_k}{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{S}} e^{u_k - \hat{p}_k} + a_0} \]
\[ R(\hat{S}, \hat{p}) = \frac{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{S}} e^{u_k - \hat{p}_k} \cdot \hat{p}_k - e^{u_j - \hat{p}_j} \cdot \hat{p}_j + e^{u_i - \hat{p}_i} \cdot \hat{p}_i}{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{S}} e^{u_k - \hat{p}_k} + a_0} \]
\[ R(\hat{S}, \hat{p}) = \frac{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{S}} e^{u_k - \hat{p}_k} \cdot \hat{p}_k + e^{u_i - \hat{p}_i} \cdot \hat{p}_i - e^{u_j - \hat{p}_j} \cdot \hat{p}_j}{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{S}} e^{u_k - \hat{p}_k} + a_0} \]
\[ R(\hat{S}, \hat{p}) = R^* + \frac{e^{u_j - \hat{p}_j}}{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{S}} e^{u_k - \hat{p}_k} + a_0} \left[ \hat{p}_i - \hat{p}_j \right] \]
\[ R(\hat{S}, \hat{p}) > R^* \]

Where we first rewrite \( R(\hat{S}, \hat{p}) \) using \((S^*, p^*)\) because we just swapped product \( i \) for product \( j \), and the total attractiveness remain the same, so the denominator does not change. Then we identify \( R(S, p) \), and we use \( u_i - \hat{p}_i = u_j - p_j \) to being able to factorize the remaining terms. So we found a pair \((\hat{S}, \hat{p})\), yielding strictly more revenue than \((S, p)\), but adding product \( i \), which contradicts the optimality of \((S^*, p^*)\).

**Proof of Lemma 2.** The proof (due to Wang and Sahin (2018)) is useful because it provides intuition on how the optimal price varies when constrained to a fixed additive market share among any two products. By the equality constraint, we have \( p_j = u_j - \ln(T - \exp(u_i - p_i)) \), so \( H(p_i, p_j) \) can be rewritten purely as a function of \( p_i \) as:

\[ H(p_i) = p_i \cdot \exp(u_i - p_i) + (u_j - \ln(T - \exp(u_i - p_i))) \cdot (T - \exp(u_i - p_i)). \]  
(17)

Now, let us calculate the first derivative of \( H(p_i) \) w.r.t. \( p_i \):

\[ \frac{\partial H(p_i)}{\partial p_i} = (-p_i + (u_j - \ln(T - \exp(u_i - p_i)))) \cdot \exp(u_i - p_i) \]  
(18)

Clearly the left-hand side term on the multiplication is monotonically decreasing from positive to negative values as \( p_i \) increases from 0 to \( \infty \). Therefore \( H(p_i) \) is strictly unimodal and reaches its maximum value at:

\[ p_i^* = p_j^* = \ln ((\exp(u_i) + \exp(u_j))/T) . \]

**Proof of Proposition 3.** We prove this result by contradiction. Let \( i \) be the first index where this condition does not hold, this means that \( p_i^* < p_{i+1}^* \). Using Lemma 2, we found \( \hat{p} \) satisfying \( p_i^* < \hat{p} < p_{i+1}^* \). Does this new price alter the consideration set? We show that this is not the case. Indeed, the effect is two-fold: the price for product \( i \) increases, and the price for product \( i + 1 \)
decreases. We analyse the effect of these two consequences:

- **Increase on price for product** $i$: This means $a(i, p)$ decreases. Note that $u_i - \hat{p} \geq u_{i+1} - p^*_i$, so neither $i > i + 1$ or $i + 1 > i$, because their attractiveness are now even closer than before. Can $i$ be dominated now by another product? No, because given that $u_i \geq u_{i+1}$ we have $u_i - \hat{p} \geq u_{i+1} - \hat{p} \geq u_{i+1} - p^*_{i+1}$. Therefore the new attractiveness of $i$ is still larger than the new attractiveness of $i + 1$, and the last inequality implies that the new attractiveness of $i$ is larger than the old attractiveness of $i + 1$, and $i + 1$ was not previously dominated either by any other product.

- **Decrease on price for product** $i + 1$: Previously $i + 1$ was not dominated by any product. Can $i + 1$ be dominated now? No, because if $i + 1$ was not dominated before, now with a smaller price $\hat{p}$ its attractiveness is larger and therefore can’t be dominated now either (the only other product that changed attractiveness was $i$, and it now has smaller attractiveness). Can $i + 1$ dominate another product now with its new higher attractiveness? No, because given that $u_i \geq u_{i+1}$ we have $u_i - p^*_i \geq u_{i+1} - p^*_i \geq u_{i+1} - \hat{p}$, so the old attractiveness of product $i$ is larger than the new attractiveness of product $i + 1$, and given that $i$ did not dominate another product before, the new price does not make $i + 1$ dominate another product either.

So, letting $p^{fix}$ exactly the same as $p^*$, but replacing both $p^*_i$ and $p^*_{i+1}$ with $\hat{p}$, means that the pair $(S^*, p^{fix})$ yields strictly more revenue than $(S^*, p^*)$ (by Lemma 2), contradicting the optimality assumption. The fact that equal intrinsic utility implies equal price at optimality, can be easily demonstrated by the following: if two equal intrinsic utility products have different prices, then using Lemma 2 we obtain strictly better revenue by assigning them the same price, and no new domination occurs, because the new price is confined between the previous prices.

**Proof of Proposition 4.** We prove this by contradiction. Let $p^*$ be the optimal solution and $i$ be the first index where this condition does not hold. This means that $u_i - p^*_i < u_{i+1} - p^*_{i+1}$. We can extrapolate this inequality further and say:

\[
    u_{i+1} - p^*_i < u_i - p^*_i < u_{i+1} - p^*_{i+1} < u_i - p^*_i + 1,\tag{19}
\]

because $u_i \geq u_{i+1}$ and $p_i \geq p_{i+1}$ by Propositions 2 and 3 respectively. We now do the following: Define $p'_i$ and $p'_{i+1}$ such as $\exp(u_i - p'_i) + \exp(u_{i+1} - p'_{i+1}) = \exp(u_i - p^*_i) + \exp(u_{i+1} - p^*_{i+1})$ and $\exp(u_i - p'_i) = \exp(u_{i+1} - p'_{i+1})$. This means that:

\[
p'_i = u_i - \ln \left( \frac{\exp(u_i - p^*_i) + \exp(u_{i+1} - p^*_{i+1})}{2} \right) \quad \text{and} \quad p'_{i+1} = u_{i+1} - \ln \left( \frac{\exp(u_i - p^*_i) + \exp(u_{i+1} - p^*_{i+1})}{2} \right).
\]

Consider $H(p_i, p_{i+1}) = p_i \cdot \exp(u_i - p_i) + p_{i+1} \cdot \exp(u_{i+1} - p_{i+1})$, where $\exp(u_i - p_i) + \exp(u_i - p_i) = \exp(u_i - p^*_i) + \exp(u_{i+1} - p^*_{i+1})$. By Lemma 2, $H(p_i, p_{i+1})$ is strictly increasing in $p_i$ for
\( p_i \leq \hat{p} \) and strictly decreasing for \( p_i \geq \hat{p} \), with \( \hat{p} = \ln \left( \frac{\exp(u_i) + \exp(u_{i+1})}{\exp(u_i - p_i) + \exp(u_{i+1} - p_{i+1})} \right) \) the solution of the corresponding maximization problem of Lemma 2. We can verify that \( \hat{p} < p_i' < p_i^* \). The first inequality is straightforward. Indeed:

\[
\begin{align*}
p_i' &= u_i - \ln \left( \frac{\exp(u_i - p_i) + \exp(u_{i+1} - p_{i+1})}{2} \right) \\
p_i' &= \ln \left[ \frac{2 \exp(u_i)}{\exp(u_i - p_i^*) + \exp(u_{i+1} - p_{i+1}^*)} \right] \\
p_i' &> \ln \left[ \frac{\exp(u_i) + \exp(u_{i+1})}{\exp(u_i - p_i^*) + \exp(u_{i+1} - p_{i+1}^*)} \right] \\
p_i' &> \hat{p}
\end{align*}
\]

proving the desired inequality. Now, for the second one:

\[
\begin{align*}
p_i' &= u_i - \ln \left( \frac{\exp(u_i - p_i) + \exp(u_{i+1} - p_{i+1})}{2} \right) \\
p_i' &= \ln \left[ \frac{2 \exp(u_i)}{\exp(u_i - p_i^*) + \exp(u_{i+1} - p_{i+1}^*)} \right] \\
p_i' &\leq \ln \left[ \frac{2 \exp(u_i)}{\exp(u_i - p_i^*) + \exp(u_{i+1} - p_{i+1}^*)} \right] \\
p_i' &= \ln \left[ \frac{2 \exp(u_i)}{\exp(u_i)(\exp(-p_i^*) + \exp(-p_{i+1}^*)))} \right] \\
p_i' &< \ln \left[ \frac{2}{2\exp(-p_i^*)} \right] \\
p_i' &< p_i^*
\end{align*}
\]

thus we have:

\[
p_i' \cdot \exp(u_i - p_i') + p_{i+1}' \cdot \exp(u_{i+1} - p_{i+1}') > p_i^* \cdot \exp(u_i - p_i^*) + p_{i+1}^* \cdot \exp(u_{i+1} - p_{i+1}^*).
\]

Meaning that we have the same assortment, but with prices \( p_i' \) and \( p_{i+1}' \) generating strictly more revenue than the optimal prices, which is a contradiction. The only thing that we have left to show that with these new prices we are still on the same consideration set. It would be enough to show that the new net utilities are bounded by previous values of net utilities. Indeed, we can verify that \( p_{i+1}^* \leq p_{i+1}' \leq p_i' \leq p_i^* \), by simply using the definitions. We also know, by hypothesis that \( u_i - p_i' = u_{i+1} - p_{i+1}' \), then \( u_i - p_i' = u_{i+1} - p_{i+1}' \leq u_{i+1} - p_{i+1}' \). So even when the price of product \( i \) decreased, the new attractiveness is bounded above by a previously existing attractiveness, thus not changing the consideration set. By the same reasoning, \( u_{i+1} - p_{i+1}' = u_i - p_i' \geq u_i - p_i^* \), meaning
that the new attractiveness is bounded below by a pre-existing one, so \( i + 1 \) is not dominated with this new prices either. So the consideration set stays the same, concluding the proof.

**Proof of Theorem 7.** We first write problem (JAPTLM-k) in minimization form to directly apply the Karush-Khun-Tucker conditions (KKT) (Karush, 1939).

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{minimize} & \quad - R^{(k)}(p) \\
\text{subject to} & \quad g_{ij}(p) \leq 0, \quad \forall 1 \leq i < j \leq k
\end{align*}
\]

The associated Lagrangean function is:

\[ L_k(p, \mu) = - R^{(k)}(p) + \sum_{1 \leq i < j \leq k} \mu_{ij} \cdot g_{ij}(p), \]

where \( \mu_{ij} \geq 0 \) are the associated Lagrange multipliers. Recall that if \( \exp(u_1 - u_k) \leq (1 + t) \), the optimal revenue \( R^{(k)} \) can be calculated using equation (12), and the solution corresponds to a fixed price policy as for the regular multinomial logit.

On the other hand, if \( \exp(u_1 - u_k) > (1 + t) \), any fixed price causes product \( k \) to be dominated by product 1. Thus, to include product \( k \) in the assortment we need to adjust the prices. Let \( p = (p_1, \ldots, p_k) \) be the optimal price vector for problem (20). Observe that it can’t happen that \( \frac{a_1(p_1)}{a_k(p_k)} < 1 + t \), since by Proposition 4, it will also means that \( \frac{u_1(p_1)}{u_k(p_k)} < 1 + t \) and using Lemma 2 we can find \( \hat{p} \) such that assigning \( \hat{p} \) to products 1 and 2 yields a larger revenue (and no dominance relation appears, since the attractiveness of product 1 was reduced, and the attractiveness of product 2 increased, but is still less than the one of product 1), which contradicts optimality. Therefore, \( g_{1k} \) must be satisfied with equality, meaning \( \frac{a_1(p_1)}{a_k(p_k)} = 1 + t \).

Furthermore, at optimality it holds \( u_i - p_i \geq u_j - p_j \quad \forall i \leq j \) (by Proposition 4), and thus the biggest ratio between attractiveness is observed for products 1 and \( k \), and is exactly equal to \( 1 + t \). This ratio can be replicated for other pairs of products, but only if they share the same net utility (and thus attractiveness) to the one of products 1 or \( k \). Therefore, it must be the case that there are integers \( k_1 \) and \( k_2 \) with \( k_1 + k_2 \leq k \), such that all products in \( I_1 = [k_1] \) share the same attractiveness \( (a_1(p_1)) \) and all products in \( I_2 = \{k - k_2 + 1, k - k_2 + 2, \ldots, k\} \) share the same attractiveness as well \( (a_k(p_k)) \). This means that the set of constraints \( C(k_1, k_2) = \{g_{ij}(p) \mid i \in I_1, j \in I_2\} \) are all satisfied with equality at optimality.

We now study the derivative of equation (21) with respect to each price \( p_i \) to obtain the KKT conditions. We here assume that the first \( k_1 \) values share the same net utility value, meaning \( u_s = u_1 - p_1 = u_i - p_i \quad \forall i \in I_1 \), and for the last \( k_2 \) products, we also have the same value of net utility, that we call \( u_f \), this is: \( u_f = u_k - p_k = u_i - p_i \quad \forall i \in I_2 \). Where these two quantities satisfy:

\[ u_s - u_f = \ln(1 + t), \]

Let us write the derivatives of the Lagrangean depending on where the index \( i \) belongs. If \( i \in I_1 \),
two relations, we can rewrite the optimal revenue as:

\[
\frac{dL_k}{dp_i} = \frac{\exp(u_i - p_i)}{\sum_{j \in S_k} \exp(u_j - p_j) + a_0} \cdot \left[ p_i - 1 - R^{(k)}(p) \right] - \exp(u_i - p_i) \cdot \sum_{j \in I_2} \mu_{ij},
\]

(22)

if \( i \in I_2 \), we have:

\[
\frac{dL_k}{dp_i} = \frac{\exp(u_i - p_i)}{\sum_{j \in S_k} \exp(u_j - p_j) + a_0} \cdot \left[ p_i - 1 - R^{(k)}(p) \right] + (1 + t) \exp(u_i - p_i) \cdot \sum_{j \in I_1} \mu_{ij},
\]

(23)

And finally, if \( i \in \hat{I}_k = [k] \setminus (I_1 \cup I_2) \), the derivative takes the following form:

\[
\frac{dL_k}{dp_i} = \frac{\exp(u_i - p_i)}{\sum_{j \in S_k} \exp(u_j - p_j) + a_0} \cdot \left[ p_i - 1 - R^{(k)}(p) \right]
\]

(24)

Observe that \( \forall i \in \hat{I}_k, \frac{dL_k}{dp_i} = 0 \implies p_i = 1 + R^{(k)}(p) \), and the right hand side is not dependent on \( i \), so all products in \( \hat{I}_k \) share the same price, which we denote \( \bar{p} \). We can rewrite all prices and the revenue depending on \( u_s \) and \( \bar{p} \), using the following relations:

1. \( \forall i \in I_1 \quad u_1 - p_1 = u_i - p_i \implies p_i = u_i - u_s \)

2. \( \forall i \in I_2 \quad u_1 - p_1 = u_i - p_i + \ln(1 + t) \implies p_i = u_i - u_s + \ln(1 + t) \)

Note now that at optimality, for a fixed \( k \), prices are determined by \( k_1 \) and \( k_2 \). Thus, the optimal revenue can be written explicitly depending on \( k \), \( k_1 \) and \( k_2 \), taking the following form:

\[
R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2) = \frac{\sum_{i \in I_1} (u_i - u_s) \exp(u_s) + \bar{p} \exp(-\bar{p}) \sum_{i \in I_2} \exp(u_i) + \sum_{i \in I_2} (u_i - u_s + \ln(1 + t)) \exp(u_s - \ln(1 + t))}{\sum_{i \in I_1} \exp(u_s) + \exp(-\bar{p}) \sum_{i \in I_2} \exp(u_i) + \sum_{i \in I_2} \exp(u_s + \ln(1 + t)) + a_0}
\]

(25)

Note that \( \bar{p} = 1 + R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2) \) (Equation 24) and let \( E(k_1, k_2) = \sum_{i \in \hat{I}_k} \exp(u_i) \). Using these two relations, we can rewrite the optimal revenue as:

\[
R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2) = e^{u_s} \frac{\sum_{i \in I_1} (u_i - u_s) + e^{u_s} \sum_{i \in I_2} (u_i - u_s + \ln(1 + t)) + E(k_1, k_2)(1 + R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2))e^{-(1+R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2))}}{e^{u_s} \left[ k_1 + \frac{k_2}{1+t} \right] + E(k_1, k_2)e^{-(1+R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2))} + a_0}
\]

(26)

Up to this point, we have an equation relating the optimal revenue \( R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2) \) and \( u_s \). From equation (22), after reordering terms we have:

\[
\frac{p_i - 1 - R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2)}{e^{u_s} (k_1 + k_2(1 + t)) + E(k_1, k_2)e^{-(1+R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2))} + a_0} = \sum_{j \in I_2} \mu_{ij}, \quad \forall i \in I_1
\]

(27)
Analogously, from equation (23), after reordering terms we have $\forall i \in I_2$:

$$
\frac{p_i - 1 - R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2)}{e^{u_s}(k_1 + k_2(1 + t)) + E(k_1, k_2)e^{-(1+R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2))} + a_0} = -(1 + t) \sum_{j \in I_1} \mu_{ji}, \quad \forall i \in I_2
$$

$$
\frac{1}{1 + t} \cdot \frac{u_i - u_s + \ln(1 + t) - 1 - R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2)}{e^{u_s}(k_1 + k_2(1 + t)) + E(k_1, k_2)e^{-(1+R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2))} + a_0} = - \sum_{j \in I_1} \mu_{ji}, \quad \forall i \in I_2 \tag{28}
$$

Now, if we add equations (27) $\forall i \in I_1$ then take equations (28) and also add them $\forall i \in I_2$, and add those two results we can derive the value $R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2)$ as follows.

$$
\sum_{i \in I_1} \mu_{ij} - \sum_{i \in I_1} \mu_{ij} = \sum_{i \in I_1} (u_i - u_s - 1 - R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2)) + \sum_{i \in I_1} (u_i - u_s + \ln(1 + t) - 1 - R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2))
$$

$$
e^{u_s}(k_1 + k_2(1 + t)) + E(k_1, k_2)e^{-(1+R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2))} + a_0
$$

$$
R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2) \left( k_1 + \frac{k_2}{1 + t} \right) = \sum_{i \in I_1} u_i + \frac{1}{1 + t} \cdot \sum_{i \in I_2} u_i - (1 + u_s) \cdot \left( k_1 + \frac{k_2}{1 + t} \right) + \frac{k_2 \ln(1 + t)}{1 + t}
$$

$$
R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2) = \frac{(1 + t) \sum_{i \in I_1} u_i + \sum_{i \in I_2} u_i + k_2 \ln(1 + t)}{k_1(1 + t) + k_2} - 1 - u_s \tag{29}
$$

We now have two equations relating $R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2)$ and $u_s$ in (26) and (29). Using these equations we can find the values of the optimal revenues and all the pricing structure while varying $k_1$ and $k_2$. If we define the following constant:

$$
C_1(k_1, k_2) = \frac{(1 + t) \sum_{i \in I_1} u_i + \sum_{i \in I_2} u_i + k_2 \ln(1 + t)}{k_1(1 + t) + k_2} - 1, \tag{30}
$$

Equation (29) becomes:

$$
R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2) = C_1(k_1, k_2) - u_s, \tag{31}
$$

and from Equation (31), we can deduce the following relations:

$$
1 + R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2) = C_1(k_1, k_2) - u_s + 1, \quad \text{and} \quad e^{-(1+R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2))} = e^{u_s - C_1(k_1, k_2) - 1}. \tag{32}
$$

We will use these relations on Equation (26). Let us first multiply both sides by the denominator on the right side:

$$
R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2) \cdot \left( e^{u_s} \left[ k_1 + \frac{k_2}{1 + t} \right] + E(k_1, k_2)e^{-(1+R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2))} + a_0 \right)
$$

$$
= e^{u_s} \sum_{i \in I_1} (u_i - u_s) + \frac{e^{u_s}}{1 + t} \cdot \sum_{i \in I_2} (u_i - u_s + \ln(1 + t)) + E(k_1, k_2)(1 + R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2))e^{-(1+R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2))}
$$
using equations (32) to replace the value of $R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2)$ and write everything depending on $u_s$ we have:

$$(C_1(k_1, k_2) - u_s) \left( e^{u_s} \left[ k_1 + \frac{k_2}{1 + t} \right] + E(k_1, k_2)e^{u_s-C_1(k_1, k_2)-1} + a_0 \right) = e^{u_s} \sum_{i \in I_1} (u_i - u_s)$$

$$+ \frac{e^{u_s}}{1 + t} \cdot \sum_{i \in I_2} (u_i - u_s + \ln(1 + t)) + E(k_1, k_2) \cdot (C_1(k_1, k_2) - u_s - 1) e^{u_s-C_1(k_1, k_2)-1}$$

(33)

We focus first on the left hand side (LHS) of Equation (33):

$$LHS = (C_1(k_1, k_2) - u_s) \left( e^{u_s} \left[ k_1 + \frac{k_2}{1 + t} \right] + E(k_1, k_2)e^{u_s-C_1(k_1, k_2)-1} \right) + a_0$$

For ease of notation, define $C_2(k_1, k_2)$ as:

$$C_2(k_1, k_2) = \left( k_1 + \frac{k_2}{1 + t} \right) + E(k_1, k_2)e^{-C_1(k_1, k_2)-1}$$

(34)

Rewriting the LHS using the value for $C_2(k_1, k_2)$:

$$LHS = (C_1(k_1, k_2) - u_s) \left[ e^{u_s} \cdot C_2(k_1, k_2) + a_0 \right]$$

(35)

We now focus on the right side (RHS) of equation (33):

$$RHS = e^{u_s} \sum_{i \in I_1} (u_i - u_s) + \frac{e^{u_s}}{1 + t} \cdot \sum_{i \in I_2} (u_i - u_s + \ln(1 + t))$$

$$+ E(k_1, k_2) \cdot (C_1(k_1, k_2) - u_s - 1) e^{u_s-C_1(k_1, k_2)-1}$$

$$RHS = e^{u_s} \left[ \sum_{i \in I_1} u_i + \frac{1}{1 + t} \cdot \sum_{i \in I_2} u_i + \frac{k_2 \ln(1 + t)}{1 + t} - u_s \left( k_1 + \frac{k_2}{1 + t} \right) \right]$$

$$+ e^{u_s} e^{-C_1(k_1, k_2)-1} E(k_1, k_2) \cdot (C_1(k_1, k_2) - u_s + 1)$$

$$RHS = e^{u_s} \cdot \left( k_1 + \frac{k_2}{1 + t} \right) [C_1(k_1, k_2) - u_s + 1] + e^{u_s} e^{-C_1(k_1, k_2)-1} E(k_1, k_2) \cdot (C_1(k_1, k_2) - u_s + 1)$$

$$RHS = e^{u_s} \cdot (C_1(k_1, k_2) - u_s + 1) \cdot \left( \left( k_1 + \frac{k_2}{1 + t} \right) + E(k_1, k_2) \cdot e^{-C_1(k_1, k_2)-1} \right)$$

$$\frac{C_2(k_1, k_2)}{C_2(k_1, k_2)}$$

$$RHS = e^{u_s} \cdot (C_1(k_1, k_2) - u_s + 1) \cdot C_2(k_1, k_2)$$

(36)
Putting together equations (35) and (36), we have:

\[ \text{LHS} = \text{RHS} \]

\[
(C_1(k_1, k_2) - u_s) \left[ e^{u_s} \cdot C_2(k_1, k_2) + a_0 \right] = e^{u_s} \cdot (C_1(k_1, k_2) - u_s + 1) \cdot C_2(k_1, k_2)
\]

\[
(C_1(k_1, k_2) - u_s) e^{u_s} \cdot C_2(k_1, k_2) + (C_1(k_1, k_2) - u_s) \cdot a_0 = (C_1(k_1, k_2) - u_s) e^{u_s} \cdot C_2(k_1, k_2) + e^{u_s} \cdot C_2(k_1, k_2)
\]

\[
(C_1(k_1, k_2) - u_s) \cdot a_0 = e^{u_s} \cdot C_2(k_1, k_2)
\]

\[ e^{u_s} = - \frac{a_0}{C_2(k_1, k_2)} \cdot (u_s - C_1(k_1, k_2)) \]  

(37)

Equation (37) has a known explicit closed form solution, and can be found using the following Lemma:

**Lemma 4.** Let \( a, b \neq 0 \) and \( c \) be real numbers and \( W(\cdot) \) be the Lambert function (Corless et al., 1996). The solution to the transcendental algebraic equation for \( x \):

\[
e^{-ax} = b(x - c),
\]

is:

\[ x = c + \frac{1}{a} \cdot W \left( \frac{ae^{-ac}}{b} \right). \]  

(38)

(39)

**Proof of Lemma 4.** Let us start with equation (38) and find an explicit solution to it.

\[
e^{-ax} = b(x - c)
\]

\[
e^{-ax} + ac = b(x - c)
\]

\[
/a \cdot e^{-ac} / b = a \cdot (x - c) \cdot e^{a(x-c)} / multiplying both sides by \( \frac{a}{b} \cdot e^{a(x-c)} \)
\]

\[
W \left( \frac{ae^{-ac}}{b} \right) = a \cdot (x - c) / using definition of \( W(\cdot) \) as in Eq. (11)
\]

\[
W \left( \frac{ae^{-ac}}{b} \right) = a \cdot (x - c) / reorganising and isolating \( x \)
\]

\[ x = c + \frac{1}{a} \cdot W \left( \frac{ae^{-ac}}{b} \right), \]

completing the proof.

Identifying terms on equation (37), the solution for \( u_s \) is:

\[ u_s = C_1(k_1, k_2) - W \left( \frac{C_2(k_1, k_2)}{a_0} \cdot e^{C_1(k_1, k_2)} \right) \]  

(40)

Let us call this value \( u_s(k, k_1, k_2) \), meaning that is a function of the integers \( k, k_1 \) and \( k_2 \). To get the revenue for this specific combination of parameters, we can simply use equation (31), giving us:

\[ R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2) = C_1(k_1, k_2) - u_s(k, k_1, k_2) \]  

(41)
Thus, the optimal revenue \( R^{(k)} \) given a specific integer \( k \) can be obtained by:

\[
R^{(k)} = \max_{k_1, k_2 \geq 1 \atop k_1 + k_2 \leq k} R^{(k)}(k_1, k_2)
\]  

(42)

Noting that there are \( O(k^2) \) pairs \((k_1, k_2)\) to evaluate, the proof follows.

\textbf{Proof of Lemma 3} The optimal revenue is already calculated in Equation (42). The proof follows by first obtaining \( u^*_s(k) \) from Equation (29). Then, for products in \( I_1 \), the price can be obtained directly since their net utility is the same as \( u^*_s(k) \). For products in \( I_2 \), since \( g_{k_2} \) is satisfied with equality, all products share the same net utility and equal to \( u^*_s(k) - \ln(1 + t) \). Finally, for products in \( \bar{I}_k \), we can use the relation provided in equation (24) to obtain the prices. More explicitly, let \((k_1^*, k_2^*)\) be the integers satisfying \( R^{(k)} = R^{(k)}(k_1^*, k_2^*) \). To obtain the optimal prices, let \( u^*_s(k) = u_s(k, k_1^*, k_2^*) \). By Equation (41) \( u^*_s(k) \) can be written as:

\[
 u^*_s(k) = \frac{(1 + t) \sum_{i \in I_1} u_i + \sum_{i \in I_2} u_i + k_2^* \ln(1 + t)}{k_1^*(1 + t) + k_2^*} - 1 - R^{(k)}
\]  

(43)

Therefore, the optimal prices are given by:

\[
p_{i}^{(k)}(k) = \begin{cases} 
    u_i - u^*_s(k) & \text{if } i \in I_1, \\
    u_i - u^*_s(k) + \ln(1 + t) & \text{if } i \in I_2, \\
    1 + R^{(k)} & \text{if } i \in \bar{I}_k 
\end{cases}
\]  

(44)

\textbf{Lemma 5.} \textit{Fixed-Price policy can be arbitrarily bad for the Joint Assortment and Pricing problem under the Threshold Luce model.}

\textit{Proof of Lemma 5.} Consider \( N + 1 \) products, with product one having \( u > 0 \) utility and \( a_0 = 1 \). For all the remaining \( N \) products let their utility to be: \( \alpha u \), with \( \alpha < 1 \) such that in presence of product one, all the rest of the products are ignored for threshold \( t \). The optimal revenue if we consider a fixed price strategy is (Li and Huh, 2011; Wang, 2012):

\[
R' = W(\exp(u - 1))
\]

Because no matter what fixed price we select, the \( N \) lower utility products are completely ignored and the first product is the only one contributing to the revenue, and this is the best revenue that we can achieve given that. Now, let us consider the optimal revenue obtained with the strategy described in Theorem (7)

\[
R^* = W \left( \left\lceil \frac{(1 + t) + N}{1 + t} \right\rceil \right) \cdot \exp \left( \frac{(1 + t)(u - 1) + N(\alpha u - 1) + N \ln(1 + t)}{(1 + t) + N} \right)
\]  

(45)

let us find an explicit relation between \( R' \) and \( R^* \). Starting from equation (45):
\[ R^* = W\left(\frac{(1 + t) + N}{1 + t}\right) \cdot \exp\left(\frac{(1 + t)(u - 1) + N(\alpha u - 1) + N \ln(1 + t)}{1 + t + N}\right) \]

\[ R^* = W\left(\frac{(1 + t) + N}{1 + t}\right) \cdot \exp\left(\frac{(u - 1) \cdot (1 + t) + N\alpha + N \ln(1 + t)}{(1 + t) + N}\right) \]

\[ R^* = W\left(\frac{(1 + t) + N}{1 + t}\right) \cdot \exp\left(\frac{(u - 1) \cdot (1 + t) - (u - 1) \cdot (1 - \alpha)}{1 + t + N \ln(1 + t)}\right) \]

We know that the Lambert function is concave, increasing and unbounded (Corless et al., 1996; Li and Huh, 2011). With this in mind, let \( u \) be such that \( \Gamma \) is greater or equal than zero (for example, setting \( u = 1.9, \alpha = 0.5 \) and \( t = 0.5 \), makes \( \Gamma > 0 \) and product 1 dominates the rest of the products), this is:

\[
\frac{\ln(1 + t)}{1 - \alpha} + 1 \geq u.
\] (46)

Using this, we have:

\[ R^* \geq W\left(\frac{(1 + t) + N}{1 + t}\right) \cdot \exp\left(u - 1\right) \] (47)

Where the argument of the Lambert function is exactly the same as \( R^* \), but multiplied by a constant factor larger than one and depending on \( N \). Putting everything together, we have:

\[ R^* \geq W\left(\frac{(1 + t) + N}{1 + t}\right) \cdot \exp\left(u - 1\right) \geq R' \] (48)

The expression in the middle can be arbitrarily larger than \( R' \) by letting \( N \) tend to infinity, and so is \( R^* \). Thus, the fixed price policy can be arbitrarily bad under the Threshold Luce model. \( \Box \)
B Numerical Experiments

This section presents numerical results on the performance of the algorithms developed in Sections 5 and 7, compared against classical algorithms in the literature such as revenue-ordered assortments for the assortment problem, and pricing policies like Fixed-Price (Li and Huh, 2011) which is optimal for the conventional MNL, and Quasi-Same price (Wang and Sahin, 2018), which is optimal for the proposed variant of the MNL including search cost. Quasi-Same Price amounts to have a fixed price for all products but one (the one having the smallest utility).

We also provide some insights on the factors that influence the nature of the solution and provide some explanation on the difference in performance between the different strategies.

B.1 Assortment Optimisation

This section presents some numerical results on the performance of revenue-ordered assortments (RO) against our proposed strategy detailed in Section 5, which we call 2SLM-OPT. In order to do this, we variate the number of products \( n \), the attractiveness of the outside option \( a_0 \) and the density \( d \) of the graph, which we use as the probability that a dominance relation is active for each pair of products\(^\dagger\). Theoretically, as shown in Example 4, the optimality gap can be as large desired. But in practice, we were able to found gaps as large as 95.40%.

Each tested family or class of instances is defined by essentially three numbers: the number of products \( n \), the attractiveness of the outside option \( a_0 \), and the density \( d \), that controls the probability that a dominance edge exists, and then we also compute the transitive closure over the resulting graph. It is worth noticing that we did not consider the case \( a_0 = 0 \) because in those cases, the optimal solution is simply selecting the highest revenue product and therefore both strategies coincide. In total, we experimented with 48 classes or families of instances, each containing 250 instances. In each specific instance, revenues and utilities are drawn from an uniform distribution between 0 and 10. We ran both strategies (RO and 2SLM-OPT) and report the average and worst optimality gap for the RO strategy. We are not providing running times, because as expected, 2SLM-OPT takes more time than RO, but all instances can be solved very fast in practice (less than half a second). Table 2 presents the results which can be summarized as follows:

1. The average gap tends to increase with the number of products, reaching about 14% for 30 products. The worst gap is more instance-dependent (as it strongly depends on the dominance structure, and how revenues are matched with attractiveness) so it can be large both in smaller and larger instances. However, it tends to increase with the density of the dominance graph, as it is more likely for RO to choose a product that dominates potential contributors whose inclusion can be more profitable than keeping the higher attractiveness one.

2. The average gap generally widens as the outside option attractiveness increases. With a high outside option, we typically expect to select more products to counterbalance the effect

\(^\dagger\)used as the probability that an edge in the dominance graph occurs
of the no-choice alternative. This can amplify the difference between 2SLM-OPT and RO as the likelihood that the optimal solution turns out to be revenue-ordered decreases, given the randomness of the dominance relation.

3. With higher densities, it is more likely to make a mistake and include a product that dominates many potential contributors that considered together, might be more profitable. Thus, both the average and worst gap widens as the density increases in general. The exception occurs at the higher end of densities where not many products can be included without provoking dominances. Here the solutions of both strategies tend to be similar and select a few higher revenue products. This is also interesting from a managerial standpoint: when customers have more clarity on what products are clearly superior in comparison, this might drift the offered assortment to be smaller, compared against when customers does not have a clear hierarchy among products.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(n, q₀, d)</th>
<th>RO Assortments</th>
<th>2SLM-OPT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(5,1,0.2)</td>
<td>0.476</td>
<td>48.899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5,1,0.4)</td>
<td>1.532</td>
<td>80.404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5,1,0.8)</td>
<td>2.812</td>
<td>71.888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5,2,0.2)</td>
<td>1.173</td>
<td>73.387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5,2,0.4)</td>
<td>1.827</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5,2,0.8)</td>
<td>4.529</td>
<td>94.759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5,4,0.2)</td>
<td>1.333</td>
<td>61.627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5,4,0.4)</td>
<td>3.378</td>
<td>69.555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5,4,0.8)</td>
<td>1.789</td>
<td>64.546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5,8,0.2)</td>
<td>5.927</td>
<td>70.854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5,8,0.4)</td>
<td>6.933</td>
<td>91.335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Avg. n = 5</td>
<td>3.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10,1,0.2)</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>51.339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10,1,0.4)</td>
<td>2.388</td>
<td>63.414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10,1,0.8)</td>
<td>3.997</td>
<td>95.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10,2,0.2)</td>
<td>1.385</td>
<td>49.292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10,2,0.4)</td>
<td>3.275</td>
<td>90.659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10,2,0.8)</td>
<td>6.495</td>
<td>73.787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10,4,0.2)</td>
<td>1.984</td>
<td>61.872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10,4,0.4)</td>
<td>5.734</td>
<td>90.983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10,4,0.8)</td>
<td>7.107</td>
<td>86.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10,8,0.2)</td>
<td>3.509</td>
<td>41.995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10,8,0.4)</td>
<td>6.592</td>
<td>82.358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10,8,0.8)</td>
<td>8.916</td>
<td>92.576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Avg. n = 10</td>
<td>4.3385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20,1,0.2)</td>
<td>1.067</td>
<td>36.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20,1,0.4)</td>
<td>2.664</td>
<td>82.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20,1,0.8)</td>
<td>2.884</td>
<td>74.534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20,2,0.2)</td>
<td>2.349</td>
<td>40.995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20,2,0.4)</td>
<td>3.452</td>
<td>41.717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20,2,0.8)</td>
<td>5.112</td>
<td>83.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20,4,0.2)</td>
<td>3.786</td>
<td>34.659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20,4,0.4)</td>
<td>8.575</td>
<td>73.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20,4,0.8)</td>
<td>7.749</td>
<td>86.321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20,8,0.2)</td>
<td>5.938</td>
<td>68.465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20,8,0.4)</td>
<td>8.88</td>
<td>52.627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20,8,0.8)</td>
<td>10.204</td>
<td>94.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Avg. n = 20</td>
<td>5.221666667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(30,1,0.2)</td>
<td>1.762</td>
<td>20.877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(30,1,0.4)</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>83.702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(30,1,0.8)</td>
<td>3.773</td>
<td>62.764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(30,2,0.2)</td>
<td>3.084</td>
<td>43.736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(30,2,0.4)</td>
<td>5.554</td>
<td>79.378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(30,2,0.8)</td>
<td>5.499</td>
<td>86.544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(30,4,0.2)</td>
<td>4.721</td>
<td>53.873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(30,4,0.4)</td>
<td>8.046</td>
<td>74.267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(30,4,0.8)</td>
<td>9.045</td>
<td>92.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(30,8,0.2)</td>
<td>7.623</td>
<td>46.498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(30,8,0.4)</td>
<td>14.266</td>
<td>91.851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(30,8,0.8)</td>
<td>11.422</td>
<td>75.239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Avg. n = 30</td>
<td>6.51125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Numerical experiments comparing the revenue ordered assortment strategy (RO) and our proposed strategy 2SLM-OPT. For each class of instances, we display the average optimality gap and the worst-case gap, as well as the computing time and the cardinality of the offered set.
B.2 Joint Assortment and Pricing Optimisation

This section presents some numerical results related to solve the Joint Assortment and Pricing Problem discussed in Section 7. We analyse the performance of algorithm TLM-Opt, compared against Fixed-Price strategy, which is optimal for the MNL and Quasi-Same Price strategy (Wang and Sahin, 2018), which is optimal for the MNL variant considered in their paper that takes into consideration search cost, and it basically a fixed price for all products but one, which share some similarities with our proposed pricing policy, as it is fixed price in general but the higher and lower ends of the utility spectrum.

Each tested family or class of instances is characterized by three numbers: the number of products $n$; the threshold $t$, that controls how tolerant are customers with respect to differences in attractiveness and the attractiveness of the outside option $a_0$, which controls how likely is that customers review all products without purchasing. In total, we experimented with 48 classes or families of instances, each containing 250 instances. In each specific instance, revenues and utilities are drawn from an uniform distribution between 0 and 10. We ran the three strategies: Fixed Price, Quasi-Same Price and TLM-Opt, and report the average and worst optimality gap for Fixed Price and Quasi-Same Price strategies, as well as cardinality of the offered set for both strategies. These numerical experiments were conducted in Python 3.6 on a computer with 8 processors (each with 3.6 GHz CPU) and 16 GB of RAM. Table 3 presents the results which can be summarized as follows:

1. As expected TLM-Opt outperformed the other two algorithms in terms of revenue, and being quite fast to execute (less than half of a second for all the instances simulated).

2. Fixed-Price policy performs the worst across the board, which is expected given that it has the lowest degrees of freedom, as shown in example 6. Although the average gap is quite low, it can be as high as 43.027%. In fact, fixed-price policy can be arbitrarily bad. A proof of this fact is provided in Appendix A, Lemma 5.

3. Quasi-Same price policy also performs well on average, and the worst gap obtained was 29.964%, which is significantly better than the worst gap for Fixed Price policy.

4. The cardinality of the optimal solution is always at least the same or greater than Fixed-Price policy. This can be observed empirically, or deduced analytically. The intuition behind it is that given the functional form of the revenue for Fixed-Price and the fact that the Lambert function is strictly increasing the strategy always try to show as much as possible. This, and the fact that under same price, the dominance relation only depends upon intrinsic utilities, imply that there is a limit on the number of products that the fixed price policy can offer without causing any domination for low intrinsic utility products. On the other hand, under TLM-Opt (or Quasi Same price) we can go further and add products in such a way that the dominance relations are not triggered, and therefore we can include more products.

$\frac{a_1(p_1)}{a_k(p_k)} = \exp(u_1-u_k) \leq (1+t)$
5. The main difference stems from the fact that our strategy leverage both ends of the utility spectrum, and reveals the following interesting insight. Sometimes in order to avoid low attractiveness products to be dominated, we want to: increase the price of the higher utility products (to make them less attractive) and at the same time, reduce the price for lower utility products, in order to make them more attractive, and making them visible for the consumer.

\[
(n, t, a_0) \quad \text{Fixed Price} \quad \text{Quasi Same Price} \quad \text{TLM-Opt.}
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(5,0.5,1)</td>
<td>2.164728</td>
<td>17.514</td>
<td>1.121</td>
<td>0.442634</td>
<td>8.609</td>
<td>2.212</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5,0.5,10)</td>
<td>2.925244</td>
<td>27.779</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>0.54798</td>
<td>11.074</td>
<td>2.248</td>
<td>1.888</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5,0.5,100)</td>
<td>4.126664</td>
<td>43.027</td>
<td>1.214</td>
<td>1.16004</td>
<td>29.964</td>
<td>2.108</td>
<td>1.856</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5,1)</td>
<td>1.573548</td>
<td>13.446</td>
<td>1.381</td>
<td>0.253996</td>
<td>4.635</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>2.028</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5,1,10)</td>
<td>2.076727</td>
<td>24.984</td>
<td>1.472</td>
<td>0.362514</td>
<td>11.116</td>
<td>2.448</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5,1,100)</td>
<td>2.726188</td>
<td>33.938</td>
<td>1.416</td>
<td>0.52712</td>
<td>14.404</td>
<td>2.368</td>
<td>1.952</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5,2)</td>
<td>0.9865</td>
<td>8.881</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>0.725548</td>
<td>8.881</td>
<td>1.812</td>
<td>2.132</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5,2,10)</td>
<td>1.4856</td>
<td>10.592</td>
<td>1.536</td>
<td>1.040596</td>
<td>10.592</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>2.116</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5,2,100)</td>
<td>2.034244</td>
<td>22.777</td>
<td>1.624</td>
<td>1.535008</td>
<td>22.564</td>
<td>2.504</td>
<td>2.196</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5,5,1)</td>
<td>0.415684</td>
<td>5.103</td>
<td>2.012</td>
<td>0.153776</td>
<td>3.748</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>2.468</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5,5,10)</td>
<td>0.918528</td>
<td>17.044</td>
<td>1.844</td>
<td>0.466556</td>
<td>17.044</td>
<td>2.424</td>
<td>2.384</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5,5,100)</td>
<td>1.692544</td>
<td>41.539</td>
<td>1.972</td>
<td>0.466548</td>
<td>7.574</td>
<td>2.552</td>
<td>2.468</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Numerical experiments comparing Fixed-Price and Quasi-Same price against TLM-Opt. For each class of instances, for non-optimal strategies we display the average optimality gap, worst-case gap and the cardinality of the offered set. We also provide the average of those metrics for each value of \( n \) considered.